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Many areas of the cyber domain of American citizens are under attack: critical 
infrastructure, electrical grids, banks, businesses, government, and personally identifiable 
information (identity theft, medical records, child exploitation, etc.). Although the focus 
of recent cybersecurity legislation has provided additional authorities to federal agencies, 
a key concern for state, local, tribal and territorial (SLTT) government entities is this: 
What is the best way to protect computer networks at the state and local level? State and 
local governments have the responsibility to protect dams, freeway systems, power and 
water plants, emergency communications, personal identifiable information, health care 
records, educational institutions, and banking systems. The array of responsibilities and 
the cybersecurity threat landscape make state- and local-level computer networks fertile 
ground for the cyber adversary. This research focuses on the threat to SLTT computer 
networks and how to leverage information-sharing initiatives, cybersecurity policies and 
state and local fusion centers to prevent, mitigate, and deter cyber threats targeted at 
SLTT computer networks.  
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Many areas of the cyber domain are under attack: critical infrastructure, electrical 
grids, banks, business, government, and the personally identifiable information (identity 
theft, medical records, child exploitation, etc.) of American citizens. Although the focus 
of recent cybersecurity legislation has provided additional authorities to federal agencies, 
a key concern for state, local, tribal and territorial (SLTT) government entities is this: 
What is the best way to protect computer networks at the state and local level? This 
research focuses on the threat to SLTT computer networks and how to leverage 
information-sharing initiatives, cybersecurity policies and state and local fusion centers to 
prevent, mitigate, and deter cyber threats targeted at SLTT computer networks.  
The reliance on computers within our society will continue to increase while new 
and increasingly sophisticated types of internet-connected devices will continue to be 
relied upon for life-sustaining activities that support most aspects of modern society. The 
lack of a collaborative strategy and framework at the state and local level to address the 
problem places SLTT entities and critical infrastructure networks at an increased risk of 
compromise.  
The cyber threat to America’s critical infrastructure, government networks, 
electrical grids, finance, education, military, and its citizens is not new. The threat 
happens daily, and it appears it will continue on into the future. The cyber threat happens 
under the cloak of secrecy. The adversaries are able to hide their identity while stealing 
intellectual property, financial information, or personal identifiable information. The 
combined threat posed by software vulnerabilities, nation-state actors, criminals, and 
hacktivist provide an increasingly tough challenge to U.S. cyber defenders. The threat is 
compounded by weaknesses in computer networks that render federal and critical 
infrastructure systems vulnerable to cyber attacks. The need for comprehensive approach 
to cybersecurity at all levels of government is needed to deter the threat.  
A 2015 cybersecurity study “State of Cybersecurity in Local, State, and Federal 
Government,” conducted by the Ponemon Institute, identified 86 percent of respondents 
 xviii 
in state and local government who believe the responsibility for managing cybersecurity 
risk in their organizations is the most stressful job they have.1 The Ponemon report points 
to the need for a more focused approach at the cybersecurity level. The approach should 
be scalable with the ability to share information efficiently from state to state. The 
information within the report identifies the need for an increased emphasis on ensuring 
state and local entities develop a cybersecurity mission and implement strategies and 
policies designed to prevent, mitigate, and deter cyber threats targeted at state and local 
government computer networks.  
This thesis examines the implementation of policies, strategies, operational 
principles, and frameworks to address the cybersecurity protection needs of SLTT 
entities. The study focuses on regional state and local fusion centers to absorb a cyber 
mission. The fusion centers inherent mission is to “correlate the gathering, analysis, 
correlation, and sharing of threat related information between the federal government and 
SLTT organizations.”2 The research also examines authorities and reviews whether state 
and local fusion centers could be used as a mechanism to prevent, protect, mitigate, and 
recover from cyber attacks at the state and local levels.  
                                                 
1 “The State of Cybersecurity in Local State and Federal Governments,” accessed December 3, 2015, 
http://ponemon.org/blog/the-state-of-cybersecurity-in-local-state-and-federal-government. 
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The cyber threat is one of the most serious economic and national security 
challenges we face as a nation … America’s economic prosperity in the 
21st century will depend on cybersecurity.  
~ The White House 
 
A. PROBLEM SPACE 
Many areas of the cyber domain of American citizens are under attack: critical 
infrastructure, electrical grids, banks, business, government, and the personally 
identifiable information (identity theft, medical records, credit card information, etc.). 
The focus of Presidential Policy Directive (PPD)-21 is to “strengthen and maintain a 
secure and resilient critical infrastructure.”1 The policy calls for a “shared responsibility 
between the Federal departments/agencies, State, Local, Tribal and Territorial (SLTT) 
entities, and public and private owners and operators of critical infrastructure.”2 The 
threats to state and local governments can be directly related to homeland security cyber 
vulnerabilities. This thesis focuses on the threat to SLTT computer networks and how to 
leverage information sharing initiatives, cybersecurity policies and state and local fusion 
centers to prevent, mitigate, and deter cyber threats targeted at SLTT computer networks.  
The reliance on computers within U.S. society will continue to increase while new 
and increasingly sophisticated types of internet-connected devices will continue to be 
relied upon for life-sustaining and activities that support most aspects of modern society. 
The lack of a collaborative strategy and framework at the SLTT level to address the 
problem, places SLTT entities and critical infrastructure networks at an increased risk of 
compromise. This compromise will be realized through the vulnerability of critical U.S. 
government computer networks. This thesis reviews the strategies being implemented at 
the federal level to protect critical computer networks. However, can the strategies and 
                                                 




policies implemented at the federal level assist state and local cybersecurity efforts? Can 
the strategies and polices at the state and local level be leveraged to provide the same 
level of protection?  
In the 2012 Delouse-NASCIO Cybersecurity Study,3 state Chief Information 
Officers (CIOs) reported that 92% of state officials feel cybersecurity is very important 
for the state; only 24% say they are very confident in protecting state’s assets against 
external threats.4 This lack of confidence can be directly related to the vulnerability of the 
computer networks to cyber attacks. The study provided the CIOs’ interpretation of the 
value of stolen personal identifiable information (PII). A study by the Ponemon Institute 
placed a number on the cost of a record during a data breach: “The average cost per lost 
or breached record is $194 per the Ponemon Institute’s 2011 Cost Data Breach Study.”5  
A more extensive and historical examination into government data breach 
compromises was identified in a January 2014 research study by FireEye, Center for 
Digital Government, which noted security breaches in the United States accounted for 
over 608 million records associated with 3,763 data breaches since January 2005. In 2012 
alone, 47% of the recorded attacks were identified as malicious attacks (hacking or 
insider threats). More than 94 million government agency records have been 
compromised between 2009 and 2012.6  
The 2014 Deloutte-NASCIO Cybersecurity Study stated that only 24% of the 
state’s’ Chief Information Security Officers (CISO) is very confident that their state’s 
information assets are protected against external cyber threats; 55% are confident, while 
                                                 
3 National Association of State Chief Information Officers (NASCIO), 2012 Deloitte-NASCIO 
Cybersecurity Study, State Governments at Risk: A Call for Collaboration and Compliance (Lexington, 
KY: National Association of State Chief Information Officers NASCIO, 2012), Executive Summary, 
http://www.nascio.org/Surveys/ArtMID/557/ArticleID/106/2012-Deloitte-NASCIO-Cybersecurity-Study-
State-governments-at-Risk-A-Call-for-Collaboration-and-Compliance. 
4 Ibid., 3. 
5 Ponemon Institute, 2011 Cost of Data Breach Study: Global (Traverse City, MI: Ponemon Institute, 
2012). 
6 “Advanced Cyber Threats in State and Local Government,” 2, accessed February 1, 2015, 
http://images.erepublic.com/documents/CDG14+SURVEY+FireEye_V2.pdf.  
 3 
16.3% are not very confident.7 This survey provides a look into the confidence of state 
leadership’s ability to protect their state’s computer network. The confidence level is very 
low considering the many collaboration and information-sharing initiatives already in-
place with federal government departments and agencies. As a result, a balanced 
comprehensive cybersecurity policy is needed to ensure cooperation and information 
sharing between federal agencies and the private sector. This cooperation would surely 
lead to a shared and more effective situational awareness that in turn would enable 
integrated operational actions to secure this nation’s cyber infrastructure.  
This study examines the implementation of policies, strategies, operational 
principles and frameworks to address the cybersecurity protection needs of SLTT entities. 
The research also examines authorities and a review of state and local fusion centers as a 
mechanism that could be utilized to prevent, protect, mitigate, and recover from cyber 
attacks at the state and local level.  
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
Should regional state and local fusion centers assist to prevent, mitigate, and deter 
cyber threats targeted at SLTT8 entities? This thesis investigates the organizational and 
individual damage cyber threats can impose upon state and local government 
(government, finance, education, and critical infrastructure) computer networks. In 
addition, it examines the benefit of deploying dedicated cyber support teams (jointly 
manned by state and local, Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and Department of 
Justice (DOJ) personnel) directly into local and regional fusion centers to absorb a 
cybersecurity mission and implement strategies and policies designed to prevent, 
mitigate, and deter cyber threats targeted at SLTT government computer networks.  
                                                 
7 “9326942 NASCIO Cybersecurity Survey,” accessed March 6, 2015, http://www.nascio.org/
publications/documents/Deloitte-NASCIOCybersecurityStudy_2014.pdf.  
8 “Cybersecurity Workforce Key to Combating Threats,” accessed April 22, 2016, http://www.nga.org/
cms/home/news-room/news-releases/2014--news-releases/col2-content/cybersecurity-workforce-key-to-
c.html. NOTE: this thesis focuses primarily on the state and local components of SLTT. Tribal and 
territorial components are a part of the acronym but are not the focus of this thesis. Although, any strategy 
or initiative discussed at the state and local level can surely be scaled or designed to accommodate the tribal 
and territorial landscape.  
 4 
The cyber threat to the nation can be intentional or unintentional, arise from a 
variety of sources, and affect every level of government. All sectors of the country are at 
risk from nation-state and non-state actors, for criminal and terrorist purposes.9 This 
study focuses on regional state and local fusion centers to absorb a cyber mission to 
handle terrorist and criminal threats. The fusion centers inherent mission is to “correlate 
the gathering, analysis, correlation, and sharing of threat related information between the 
federal government and SLTT organizations.”10 State and local fusion centers are 
uniquely positioned (physically and operationally) to defend against, mitigate, and 
prevent the cyber threat facing SLTT computer networks.  
This research provides the following:  
• An analysis of the cyber threat to SLLT entities 
• An assessment of applicable current fusion center policies relating to 
cybersecurity 
• An analysis of state fusion centers’ ability to accept a new mission focus 
of cybersecurity defense, mitigation, and analysis, including the 
establishment of cybersecurity teams or groups resident within the centers 
• A proposed strategy for regional fusion centers and state security 
operation centers to partner with the federal government’s departments 
and agencies in a consolidated cybersecurity collaboration mission 
 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW  
The size and complexity of the cyber threat is consistently growing. The 
challenges America faces in securing cyberspace can be found at all levels of 
government, public, and private computer domains. In tackling this complex subject, this 
literature review attempts to summarize the books, articles, congressional reports, and 
journals related to cybersecurity and information assurance strategies. The review 
                                                 
9 “Intel Heads Now Fear Cyber Attack More Than Terror,” March 13, 2013, http://abcnews.go.com/
Blotter/intel-heads-now-fear-cyber-attack-terror/story?id=18719593.  
10 “State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers,” accessed February 11, 2014, http://www.dhs.gov/
state-and-major-urban-area-fusion-centers.  
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examines four areas: the cyber threat facing SLTT entities, fusion centers, leadership 
thoughts and strategies, and cybersecurity federal policies, governance and laws. 
1. Cyber Threats—Government Reporting 
This section reviews policies and laws that allow for information sharing between 
government agencies and amongst industry partners. The Government Accounting Office 
(GAO) has written extensive articles on cybersecurity covering a wide range of topics. 
The following articles pertain to the cyber threat: “Threats Impacting the Nation,” 
“Continued Attention Needed to Protect Our Nation’s Critical Infrastructure,” 
“Cyberspace Policy,” “Challenges Securing the Electricity Grid,” and “A Better Defined 
and Implemented National Strategy is Needed to Address Persistent Challenges.” The 
GAO supports Congress as a bi-partisan organization that investigates federal 
government departments and agencies to ensure accountability in an effort to make the 
government more effective and efficient.11 In support of its oversight mission, the GAO’s 
investigation of the cybersecurity landscape has been comprehensive and revealing.  
Cyber threats impacting the nation continue to be a revolving and growing threat 
of an intentional and unintentional nature. The reports discuss cybersecurity threat 
sources, types of cyber exploits, the vulnerability of critical infrastructure to cyber  
attacks, and the number and types of cyber incidents reported to federal agencies. This 
information is mostly focused on critical infrastructure and government agencies that 
report incidents to the federal government. 
The 18 critical infrastructure sectors rely heavily on computer networks to 
communicate secure information. The threats against critical infrastructure assets were 
detailed and provide insight into the daunting task of securing the networks and the 
information it contains. The federal government has taken a number of steps to secure the 
networks, such as a Presidential appointment of a Special Assistant to the President for 
Cybersecurity, DHS issuance of an updated version of the National Infrastructure 
Protection Plan, and the establishment of the National Cybersecurity and 
Communications Integration Center (NCCIC) by the DHS in 2009 as a communication 
                                                 
11 “About GAO,” accessed March 6, 2015, http://www.gao.gov/about/index.html.  
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center to coordinate national response to cyber incidents. However, the GAO Report 
(Continued Attention Needed to Protect Our Nation’s Critical Infrastructure) list a 
number of significant challenges that remain and need to be addressed, although, SLTT 
entities are not addressed, even though they may be responsible for the security of critical 
infrastructure networks within their state(s).12 The GAO discussed how a national 
strategy was needed to address persistent challenges in support of federal government 
departments and agencies. A review of cyber incidents reported to government agencies 
from 2006 to 2012 showed a consistent climb (782%) in cyber incidents. Three key 
challenges were “designing and implementing risk-based cybersecurity programs at 
federal agencies, establishing and identifying standards for critical infrastructures, and 
detecting, responding to, and mitigating cyber incidents.”13 A look at how cybersecurity 
strategy has evolved was also discussed and details were provided on additional desirable 
characteristics.  
2. Cyber Policy  
One of the primary thrusts of the May 2010 White House Cyberspace Policy 
Review is to “implement coherent unified policy guidance where necessary in order to 
clarify authorities, roles and responsibilities … across the Federal government.”14 The 
bill was a policy targeted at the evolving tactics of the adversary. However, the bill, 
which went through several changes, continues to be in draft in Congress. The lack of 
movement on this critical legislation comes with a price.  
                                                 
12 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Cybersecurity: Continued Attention Needed to Protect Our 
Nation’s Critical Infrastructure Statement of Gregory C. Wilshusen, Director, Information Security Issues 
(GAO-11-865T) (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2011), http://www.gao.gov/
assets/130/126702.pdf. 
13 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Cybersecurity: A Better Defined and Implemented 
National Strategy Is Needed to Address Persistent Challenges Statement of Gregory C. Wilshusen, Director 
Information Security Issues (GAO-13-462T) (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 
2013), http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-462T. 
14 The White House, Cyberspace Policy Review, Assuring a Trusted and Resilient Information and 
Communication Infrastructure (Washington, DC: The White House, 2009), 10, 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/assets/documents/Cyberspace_Policy_Review_final.pdf. 
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In May 2009, during his speech on Cybersecurity, President Obama detailed a 
McAfee estimate that the global cost of cybercrime at approximate $1 trillion.15 During 
the deliberations on the Cybersecurity Act of 2012, Senators Lieberman and Collins 
referenced a Symantec estimate that the theft of intellectual property to American 
companies cost $250 billion a year.16 The speed at which the cyberspace domain evolves 
and the number of adversaries (big and small) attempting to take advantage of America’s 
lack of policy, security, and resiliency makes cybersecurity one of America’s greatest 
security challenges. Securing the web against cyber attacks is a national priority as cyber 
criminals attempt to steal U.S. critical information and trade secrets. 
Although Congress has failed to act, President Obama continues to push for 
increasing policies and directives, as the Administration has produced an executive order 
(EO) “Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity” and PPD-21 “Critical 
Infrastructure Security and Resilience” to help secure America’s cyber infrastructure. 
PPD-21 states, “The Federal Government shall work with critical infrastructure owners 
and operators and SLTT entities to take proactive steps to manage risk and strengthen the 
security and resilience of the Nation’s critical infrastructure”17 The policy combines the 
efforts of all three organizations to protect critical infrastructure assets and how a unity of 
effort is needed to advance and strengthen critical infrastructure security and resilience.  
In February 2015, President Obama signed the Promoting Private Sector 
Cybersecurity Information Sharing EO. Presently, “most private sector information 
sharing is conducted through Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs) … these 
groups primarily operate on a sector model, where companies within a certain sector (i.e., 
financial services, energy, aviation, etc.) share information about threats within that 
                                                 
15 The White House, “President Obama on Cybersecurity” (transcript, The White House, May 29, 
2009).  
16 “Psychology Behind Intellectual Property Theft by Corporate Insiders,” accessed 14 October 2012, 
https://www.symantec.com/about/newsroom/press-releases/2011/symantec_1207_01. 




sector.”18 The ISAC model has been adopted by the energy, communications, 
information technology (IT), states, and financial sectors to name a few. The model is not 
a totally inclusive mechanism for information sharing because many companies do not fit 
within an established sector. As a result, some companies have attempted to develop their 
own information sharing and analysis organizations (ISAOs). Like ISACs, the purpose of 
ISAOs is to gather, analyze, and disseminate threat information, but unlike ISACs, they 
are not’ sector-affiliated. The EO directs DHS to encourage the development of ISAOs.19  
The Administrations initiatives are strategies and guidelines that identify critical 
infrastructure sectors and advance the idea of a national unity of effort. The authorities 
and directives attempt to “refine and clarify roles and relationships across the Federal 
Government.”20  
3. Leadership Thoughts and Strategies 
Speaking in September 2012, Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano 
said, “threats to the U.S. cyber infrastructure were one of the most serious and rapidly 
evolving threats the nation faces.”21 Four months later, in January 2013, the Secretary 
said, “We shouldn’t wait until there is a 9/11 in the cyber world. There are things we can 
and should be doing right now that, if not prevent, would mitigate the extent of 
damage.”22  
One of the first to speak of this cyber 9/11 was Secretary of Defense Leon 
Panetta. In October 2012, Secretary Panetta, speaking at the annual awards dinner for the 
non-profit organization, Business Executives for National Security, stated, “A cyber-
                                                 
18 “Information Sharing and Analysis Organizations (ISAOs),” accessed April 9, 2016, 
https://www.dhs.gov/isao.  
19 “Executive Order—Promoting Private Sector Cybersecurity Information Sharing,” accessed March 
21, 2015, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/02/13/executive-order-promoting-private-
sector-cybersecurity-information-shari.  
20 “Presidential Policy Directive—Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience.” 
21 Janet Napolitano, “Cyber Attacks One of the Most Serious Threats,” Infosecurity, September 11, 
2012, www.Infosecurity-Magazine.com.  
22 Janet Napolitano, “U.S. Homeland Chief: Cyber 9/11 Could Happen “Imminently,”“ Reuters, 
January 24, 2013, www.Reuters.com/article.  
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attack perpetrated by nation states or violent extremist groups could be as destructive as 
the terrorist attack of 9/11.”23  
Philip Reitinger, former Deputy Under Secretary for DHS National Protection and 
Programs Directorate (NPPD), thinks the United States should implement a “cyber 
ecosystem” … where “cyber devices have innate capabilities that enable them to work 
together to anticipate and prevent cyber attacks in near real-time.”24 Reitinger advocates 
an ecosystem where “cyber devices communicate in near real-time with each other about 
attacks, and take coordinated security hardening response actions consistent with a 
defined policy framework, allowing many security risks to be managed proactively and 
dynamically.”25 
General Keith Alexander, director of the National Security Agency and the 
commander of U.S. Cyber Command said, “The U.S. must work with its partners in 
industry and its allies to solve the problem.”26 Gen. Alexander is endorsing a whole 
government approach, combined with industry and international partners, to solve the 
nation’s cyber problems. Gen. Alexander also proposes a “defensible architecture,”27 a 
virtual cloud-based network defense and offense, a process that takes the cyber fight to 
the adversaries.  
Franklin Kramer, a senior political appointee in two administrations, a former 
Distinguished Research Fellow at the National Defense University, and principal author 
of Cyberpower and National Security, echoed Gen. Alexander’s thoughts stating, “the 
U.S. must create an effective national and international strategic framework for the 
                                                 
23 Gopal Ratman, “Cyberattacks Could Become as Destructive as 9/11: Panetta,” Bloomberg, October 
11, 2012, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-10-12/cyberattacks-could-become-as-destructive-
as-9-11-panetta. 
24 Philip Reitinger, Enabling Distributed Security in Cyberspace, Building a Healthy and Resilient 
Cyber Ecosystem with Automated Collective Action, Department of Homeland Security (Washington, DC: 
Department of Homeland Security, 2011), 5, https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/nppd-cyber-ecosystem-
white-paper-03-23-2011.pdf. 
25 Ibid., 6. 
26 Cheryl Pellerin, “Cybersecurity Involves Federal, Industry Partners, Allies, American Forces Press 
Service,” 1, accessed December 15, 2012 http://archive.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=118479.  
27 Ibid., 3.  
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development and use of cyber as part of an overall national security strategy.”28 Kramer 
also believes the United States should adopt a cyber warfare or “computer network 
attack” (CNA) strategy.29 He believes CNA strategies should attempt to reduce 
classifications and enhance integration to provide comprehensive offensive strategies to 
deter U.S. adversaries.  
One key difference between the approach identified by Alexander and Kramer but 
not mentioned directly by Reitinger is the idea of offensive attacks against an adversary. 
Both Alexander and Kramer are from the Department of Defense (DOD) community. 
The concept of offensive operations, designed to deter an enemy, is not only considered 
but plays a big role in the defense of the cyber domain. Reitinger’s cyber ecosystem 
adheres to a cooperative approach amongst systems to communicate when attacks 
happen. This strategy is designed to mitigate and possibly deter the adverse effects of a 
cyber-attack.  
4. Fusion Centers 
The National Security Strategy of May 2010 states, “To prevent acts of terrorism 
on American soil, we must enlist all of our intelligence, law enforcement, and homeland 
security capabilities. We will continue to integrate and leverage state and major area 
fusion centers that have the capability to share classified information”30 DHS initiated a 
program in 2010 to pass secret-level classified information with industry officials through 
the use of fusion centers. The Cybersecurity Partner Local Access Plan (CPLAP) was 
designed to allow industry officials the ability to go to their local fusion center and 
review classified information, and at the same time, build a relationship between critical 
infrastructure and key resource partners with fusion center officials.31 The fusion center 
public-private partnership continued to build in July 2011 in the Northeastern part of the 
                                                 
28 Franklin D. Kramer, Policy Recommendations for a Strategic Framework (Washington, DC: 
Cyberpower and National Security, National Defense University Press, 2010), 7.  
29 Ibid., 14. 
30 The White House, National Security Strategy (Washington, DC: The White House, 2010), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf. 
31 “DHS, Industry to Try Fusion Centers for Classified Data Swap,” accessed February 11, 2014, 
http://fcw.com/Articles/2010/03/16/Web-cyber-threat-fusion-center.aspx?p=1.  
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United States as the fusion centers in Delaware, Virginia, Maryland, New Jersey, and 
Pennsylvania met with their public private partners to collaborate on information-sharing 
practices and threat information regarding critical infrastructure.32 In 2012, on the West 
Coast, the Northern California Regional Center (NCRIC) held a cybersecurity roundtable 
with partners from the financial and IT sectors.33 This partnership, led by DHS, continues 
to grow throughout the country. The importance of this partnership is further examined in 
a section within this thesis.  
Although an emphasis was placed on using the fusion centers to protect the 
homeland, provide an atmosphere of collaboration, and increase information sharing 
between the federal government and SLTT entities; fusions centers were given a failing 
grade on the October 3, 2012 by the U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on 
Investigation. The report found “that DHS’ work with those state and local fusion centers 
has not produced useful intelligence to support federal counterterrorism efforts.”34 The 
report is completely contrary to the National Preparedness Report (NPR), which key 
findings stated, “A network of state and regional fusion centers and Joint Terrorism Task 
Force (JTTF) has significantly improved analytical and information sharing capabilities 
among law enforcement, homeland security, and Intelligence Community entities at all 
levels of government.”35 The NPR used a survey to obtain its analysis. The 
Subcommittee on Investigations reviewed reports, visited fusion centers, and analyzed 
budget decisions, in comparison to DHS requirements. Although the report is very critical 
of the fusion centers, the recommendation section holds optimism that the problems can 
be corrected. 
                                                 
32 “Fusion Centers and Public-Private Collaboration,” accessed February 17, 2014, http://ise.gov/blog/
major-thomas-souchek/fusion-centers-and-public-private-collaboration.  
33 “Fusion Centers and Private Sector Come Together on Cybersecurity,” accessed January 15, 2014, 
https://www.ise.gov/blog/mike-sena/fusion-centers-and-private-sector-come-together-cybersecurity.  
34 United States Senate, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Federal Support for and 
Involvement in State and Local Fusion Centers (Washington, DC: United States Senate, 2012), Executive 
Summary, www.CDN.GOVEXEC.com. 
35 Department of Homeland Security, National Preparedness Report (Washington, DC: Department of 
Homeland Security, 2012), 12, http://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/20130726-1833-25045-2705/
national_preparedness_report_20120330_v2_1.pdf. 
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The first recommendation by the Subcommittee on Investigations was for DHS to 
“conform its efforts to match its counterterrorism statutory purpose, or redefine DHS’ 
fusion center mission.”36 Four months earlier, a change in fusion centers’ security 
challenges were echoed at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. The 
Center for Homeland Defense and Security Fusion Center Leaders Program (FCLP) 
conducted June 5–8, 2012, highlighted the “Shifting Security Challenges.”37 Twenty-five 
fusion center leaders gathered to share ideas on information-sharing strategies that could 
be utilized across the state and local fusion center network.38  
5. State, Local, Tribal, and Territorial  
As the nation goes about trying to protect its information, a key concern within 
the cyber community is deciding the best way to protect the SLTT organizations. Has the 
federal government adequately supported the SLTT entities? Or, does the federal 
government have the task to coordinate and protect state and local entities?  
The March 2012 National Preparedness Report stated, “Cybersecurity was the 
single core capability where states had made the least amount of overall progress. In 
addition, DHS’s 2011 Nationwide Cybersecurity Review highlighted gaps in cyber-
related preparedness among 162 state and local entities.”39 The ability to secure SLTT 
networks normally takes a back seat to the highly publicized attacks that affect critical 
infrastructure, or the energy or the defense industrial base. A 2012 Deloutte-NASCIO 
Cybersecurity Study,40 state CIO’s reported that 92% of state officials think 
cybersecurity is a priority and only 24% think their state is positioned to protect the state 
resources from a cyber-attack.41  
                                                 
36 United States Senate, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Federal Support for and 
Involvement in State and Local Fusion Centers, 106. 
37 “Fusion Centers Are Meeting Shifting Security Challenges,” June 29, 2012, https://www.chds.us/
c/item/771.  
38 Ibid. 
39 FEMA, 2012 National Preparedness Report (NPR) (Washington, DC: FEMA, 2012). 
40 National Association of State Chief Information Officers (NASCIO), 2012 Deloitte-NASCIO 
Cybersecurity Study, State Governments at Risk: A Call for Collaboration and Compliance, Executive 
Summary. 
41 Ibid., 3. 
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What is lacking in the current research is a consolidated strategy and framework 
on how to best incorporate the cyber threat faced by SLTT entities into the federal and 
private sector strategy to protect the cyber domain. Further analysis is also needed to 
determine if state and local fusion centers have a role in the fight against cyber threat 
actors in the protection and information security of the SLTT cyber infrastructure. 
D. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis examines a whole-of-government approach to analyze a strategy and 
policy that will protect SLTT entities better from cyber threats.  
The research question addresses the viability of state and local fusion centers’ 
ability to absorb an adjunct mission and implement strategies and policies designed to 
prevent, mitigate, and deter cyber threats targeted at SLTT entities. This thesis uses a 
qualitative research method to interpret new insights into the cyber threat phenomenon 
facing the nation. The study identifies key cybersecurity shortfalls in SLTT cyber defense 
strategies, and suggests new concepts and strategies to protect state and local computer 
networks. The research can be used to judge the effectiveness of federal, executive, and 
homeland security policies, strategies, and directives to identify gaps and determine 
effective policies, strategies, and frameworks to address the cyber threats targeted at 
SLTT entities.  
Secondary data collection centers on the literature review. The collection of 
literature includes government policies, GAO reports, Congressional Research Service 
(CRS) reports, studies, information-sharing initiatives, policies, executive actions, and 
other data sources as appropriate. Visits to fusion centers in Baltimore, Maryland and San 
Francisco, California will be used to get a first-hand look at the fusion centers’ missions, 
capabilities, processes, and procedures. These locations were selected because of the 
proximity of the fusion centers to the author’s residence and the Naval Postgraduate 
School in Monterey, CA. The analysis of the procedural data, observed during the visits 
to the fusion centers, allows for an assessment of the center’s’ capabilities in comparison 
to their documented strengths and weaknesses, as detailed in the literature review. The 
visits to these locations also provide insights into the ability of the fusion centers to take 
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on an adjunct mission of cyber security. Combined with the analysis of the resource 
material, this research allows for an assessment of the types of cyber threats targeted at 
state and local government departments.  
A review of the literature, an analysis of the cyber threat to SLTT entities, an 
examination of the current cybersecurity policies, and an analysis of the state and local 
fusion center mission allow for the development of a strategy, policy, and framework to 
address the thesis hypothesis.  
The goal of this thesis is to analyze the cyber threat to the nation and to SLTT 
computer networks, introduce fusion centers as a viable cybersecurity option, and 
examine their ability to accept a new mission focused of cybersecurity defense, 
mitigation, and recovery. Lastly, this thesis proposes a strategy that would incorporate 
cybersecurity teams into fusion centers in an effort to protect SLTT entities better from 
cyber threats. The cybersecurity teams’ concept is adopted from the combat support 
group (CSG) concept used by agencies within the intelligence community to provide 
specialized teams to help strengthen specific mission and operational requirements 
needed to accomplish the operational and strategic goals.  
E. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
The chapter examined the cyber threat to the nation, to SLTT entities, the possible 
role of fusion centers in countering the threat, and a strategy or framework to address the 
cybersecurity protection of SLTT computer networks.  
Chapter II examines the cyber threat. What is the seriousness of the threat? Is a 
collaborative approach to identify, protect, deter, and minimize the threat working to 
secure the nation’s computer networks? The chapter reviews specific polices and strategy 
used to strengthen cybersecurity information sharing and collaboration. An analysis of 
what has worked and has not worked is provided. The purpose is to frame the problem 
and start the process of outlining opportunities for improvement. The chapter closes by 
examining the effect the threat is having on SLTT computer networks.  
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Chapter III focuses on the challenges faced by SLTT entities and state CIOs. A 
clear identification of the cyber threat to SLTT networks and the challenges also include 
a review of the currently on-going collaboration efforts and the options and strategies 
utilize to provide support to SLTT governments. The chapter introduces the fusion 
centers as a viable option to absorb an additional cybersecurity mission capability.  
Chapter IV will focus on the national response to the cyber threat and examine the 
cybersecurity strategies, policies, EOs and laws that are primarily designed to support 
information sharing at the federal level and between public and private industry partners. 
A review of the operational framework will be analyzed to identify if the standard can be 
used across the cyber landscape. 
Chapter V examines the cyber threat and the seriousness of the threat to state and 
local governments. It discusses the various programs, partnerships, and accompanying 
policies that allow federal government assets, information, and capabilities to be 
leveraged by SLTT governments. 
Chapter VI examines the fusion centers from a cyber perspective. The chapter 
analyzes the roles and responsibilities of the organizations with the authority or 
responsibility to assist SLTT entities against the cyber threats.  
Finally, Chapter VII provides conclusions from the research, answers the research 
question, and offers a comprehensive approach to cybersecurity in the fight against cyber 
threats targeted at SLTT entities.  
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II. THE CYBER THREAT TO THE NATION 
This chapter examines the cyber threat to the nation and its impact on America’s 
critical infrastructure, government, and state and local computer networks. The cyber 
threat to America’s critical infrastructure, government networks, electrical grids, finance, 
education, military, and its citizens is not new. The threat happens daily and it appears it 
will continue on into the future. The cyber threat happens under the cloak of secrecy. The 
adversaries are able to hide their identity while stealing intellectual property, financial 
information, and personal identifiable information. The adversaries test their trade by 
attempting to overwhelm by denying access to the network by shutting down computer 
servers that house financial data, that operate dams and electrical grids, or that safeguard 
military networks. Networks that house critical information that allows the country to 
continue to advance its economic and national security are being targeted on a daily, 
hourly basis. The cyber adversary is illusive and understands the threat environment. 
Since the size of the internet is so vast, likewise is the opportunity space for the hacker, 
the criminal, and the nation-state actor. The hacktivist is someone or a group who hacks 
into the computer as a form of protest. The hacktivist is motivated mostly by political 
gain and not for profit. The cyber criminal (a person or group) uses the computer to steal 
a person’s identity, hack into financial accounts, sends bogus emails to gain access and 
control of a victim’s computer and infect their computer with a malicious virus. The 
nation-state actors are funded and resourced very well. They can employ hackers, 
military and civilian computer personnel to gain access to computers that hold PII, 
financial data, intellectual property, and other critical information. The hacker, cyber 
criminal, and nation-state actor often times take advantage of software vulnerabilities that 
can negatively affect computer networks.  
A. NETWORK VULNERABILITIES 
In 2012, the Shamoon virus, also known as W32.Disttrack, was a threat that 
targeted the energy sector. The destructive malware corrupted files on a compromised 
computer and then overwrites the master boot record (MBR) and renders the computer 
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useless.42 The virus was responsible for an attack on 30,000 Saudi Aramco (oil and gas 
enterprise in Saudi Arabia) computers. The virus was not used for personal financial gain, 
or to steal PII data but was designed and targeted at the oil company to damage the 
organization.43 Then Secretary of State, Leon Panetta stated, “The ‘Shamoon’ virus … 
was probably the most destructive attack the business sector has seen to date.” He went 
on to say, “While this kind of tactic isn’t new, the scale and speed with which it happened 
was unprecedented.”44 
The Heartbleed vulnerability burst onto the computer scene in April 2014. The 
bug is a serious vulnerability to the internet, as it exposes weaknesses in the OpenSSL 
(secure socket layer) cryptographic software library. Since the internet is used by so 
many users, security must be in place to ensure that email, instant messaging (IM) and 
virtual private networks (VPNs) can communicate securely, and SSL is one form of 
software that allows for secure communications. OpenSSL allows for an encryption to be 
applied to the internet to allow for increased security; in essence, it protects the electronic 
traffic on websites and electronic devices. This encryption provides security over internet 
applications, such as email, IM, and web-based browsing to name a few.45 Netcraft, an 
internet service company based in England, estimated that 17.5% of SSL sites, 
accounting for around half a million certificates, were vulnerable to the Heartbleed bug.46 
The Heartbleed vulnerability allows the attacker to act as a spy; they can steal data, hide 
their identity, or impersonate another person’s identity. This vulnerability can provide 
access to the memory and controller data of the servers and clients. About the time the 
Heartbleed vulnerability had been contained, the Bash vulnerability seemed to appear.  
                                                 
42 “The Shamoon Attacks,” accessed February 18, 2016, http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/
shamoon-attacks.  
43 “Why the Shamoon Virus Looms as Destructive Threat,” accessed February 18, 2016, 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/cybertruth/2013/05/16/shamoon-cyber-warfare-hackers-anti-american/
2166147/.  
44 Dino Grandoni, “The Most Destructive Virus to Ever Hit a Business?,” The Huffington Post, 
accessed February 18, 2016, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/10/11/shamoon-virus-leon-
panetta_n_1960113.html. 
45 “Heartbleed Bug,” accessed February 10, 2015, http://heartbleed.com/.  




In September 2014, the Bash Bug vulnerability was a bug that affected UNIX and 
LINUX operating systems. The operating system (a critical part of the computer) is the 
software that allows the user to talk to the computer without knowing the computer 
language. The bug, also known as ShellShock, targets the shell of the software to allow 
an attacker to gain access. The vulnerability, when exploited, would allow attackers to 
steal information and control the computer or gain access to the entire computer 
network.47 The magazine Information Week estimated the Heartbleed bug affected 500 
million computers. The magazine quoted the BBC (British Broadcasting Corporation) as 
stating the same number could also be affected by the Bash vulnerability.48 The 
ShellShock vulnerability dates back to 1994. Another bug that has infected computer 
systems in the past is the Conflicker virus, which has re-emerged as a new vulnerability 
on the cyber landscape. 
The Conficker worm was first noticed in 2008,49 and takes advantage of security 
flaws in Microsoft Office. The computer worm is a standalone malware program that 
replicates itself to affect other computers.50 The worm travels on the internet searching 
for flaws in operating systems to infect and control other computers. Many experts say ‘it 
is the worst computer infection since the Slammer worm in 2003, and as many as nine 
million computers could have been infected.51 Worms are different from viruses, as they 
can operate independently and do not require any human involvement. Worms also allow 
infected computers to act together to form botnets (an army of computers). This 
functionality provides the cyber criminals the ability to scale their operations and to hide 
their identity even more. Both worms and viruses take advantage of software 
                                                 
47 “ShellShock: All You Need to Know about the Bash Bug Vulnerability,” accessed February 10, 
2015, http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/shellshock-all-you-need-know-about-bash-bug-
vulnerability.  




50 “What Is a Computer Worm,” accessed February 12, 2015, http://www.pctools.com/security-news/
what-is-a-computer-worm/.  
51 “Worm Infects Millions of Computers Worldwide,” accessed March 14, 2014, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/23/technology/internet/23worm.html?_r=0. 
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vulnerabilities known by the cyber criminal. However, many vulnerabilities have not yet 
been discovered. These vulnerabilities are known as zero-day exploits. 
A zero-day exploit refers to a “hole in the software that is unknown to the 
vendor.”52 The zero-day exploit is a race against time between the cyber criminal who 
attempts to exploit the software and the vendor who attempts to discover the vulnerability 
and close the software hole. A perfect example of the zero-day exploit was witnessed in 
January 2015, when Adobe Systems disseminated a critical patch for their popular Adobe 
Flash software. The vulnerability had been discovered by cyber criminals who were 
taking advantage of the hole in the software to launch malicious malware attacks, using 
drive-by downloads and malicious ads.53 Unknown computer users who visit legitimate 
websites and unknowingly click on malicious advertising were infected with the virus. 
Adobe needed to work fast to minimize the effects of the compromised software. 
However, the criminals were working even faster, as Adobe eventually had to patch three 
vulnerabilities in three weeks with regards to this exploit.54 
The primary reason for focusing on vulnerabilities in networks is not only to 
identify the vulnerability but also to pose the question, how prepared are SLTT entities 
prepared to defend against the vulnerabilities? A 2014 FireEye report stated, “Strapped 
for resources, state and local governments are a prime target for the pervasive and 
sophisticated threats launched by stealthy cyber criminals.”55 Limited resources 
(financial, personnel, capabilities, etc.) to defend against cyber threats provide a greater 
opportunity for a successful attack. What strategy is needed to prevent, mitigate, and 
deter cyber threats targeted at SLTT government computer networks? 
                                                 
52 “Adobe Pushes Critical Flash Player Update to Fix Latest Zero-Day,” January 26, 2015, 
http://www.pcworld.com/article/2875252/adobe-pushes-critical-flash-player-update-to-fix-latest-
zeroday.html.  
53 “Adobe Confirms Patch for Newest Zero-Day Vulnerability,” February 2, 2015, 
http://www.csoonline.com/article/2878778/application-security/adobe-confirms-patch-for-newest-zero-
day-vulnerability.html.  
54 “Anonymous Hackers, Your Unmasked Face Picture Might Be in This List!,” accessed February 12, 
2015, http://cyberwarzone.com/anonymous-hackers-unmasked-face-picture-might-list/.  
55 Center for Digital Government, Advanced Cyber Threats in State and Local Government (Folsom, 
CA: Center for Digital Government, 2014), http://nascio.org/events/sponsors/vrc/
Advanced%20Cyber%20Threats%20in%20State%20and%20Local%20Government.pdf. 
 21 
B. THREAT ACTORS  
There are only two types of companies: those that have been hacked and 
those that will be. 
~ FBI Director Robert Mueller 
 
Director Mueller’s comments at the RSA Conference in San Francisco, California 
echoes the severity of the IT threat to the nation. Director Mueller went on to say, 
“Terrorism does remain the FBI’s (Federal Bureau of Investigations) top priority, but in 
the not too-distant-future we anticipate that the cyber threat will pose the greatest threat 
to our country.”56 Today, terrorists utilize technology to enable an operation to be carried 
out (propaganda, training, financial support, cyber attacks, etc.).57 From a cyber 
perspective, technology allows the cyber attackers to mask their identity, expand their 
reach, multiply their impact on computer networks and systems, and increase the 
destructive effect on individual privacy, business proprietary information, critical 
infrastructure, and government departments and agencies. This section examines the 
threat from nation-state actors, terrorist, criminals, and hacktivists.  
1. Nation-State 
Cyber theft is real theft, and we will hold state-sponsored cyber thieves 
accountable as we would any other transnational criminal organization 
that steals our goods and breaks our laws.58  
~ Assistant Attorney General for National Security John Carlin  
 
On May 19, 2014, the U.S. government charged five Chinese military hackers for 
hacking, stealing economic secrets, and other offenses directed at U.S. nuclear power and 
                                                 
56 Ibid. 
57 “Terrorism: Role of Technology in Contemporary Terrorism,” accessed February 19, 2016, 
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critical infrastructure industries.59 The charges date back to 2006 and specifically name a 
military unit with the Chinese People’s Liberation Army. 
In April 2014, a British newspaper reported an FBI investigation into a 
“sophisticated high-level” cyber-attack attributed to the Russians targeting U.S. financial 
institutions. Wall Street business J.P. Morgan Chase was one of two financial institutions 
named in the attacks.60  
In November 2014, DHS identified a “BlackEnergy” malware that had been used 
against several industrial control system critical infrastructure companies in the United 
States. DHS stated the activity could be traced back to 2011 and had been attributed to a 
Russian cyber espionage group named “Sandworm.” The Trojan horse style of malware 
had not been activated but was found on several organizations networks.61  
In November 2014, a cyber espionage group named the Guardians of Peace 
(#GOP) targeted Sony Picture Entertainment and hacked into their email accounts and 
stole PII data from the organization. The #GOP leaked PII data to the public to embarrass 
Sony Executives in response to a film “The Interview,” which depicts two Americas 
attempting to assassinate the North Korean leader Kim Jong Um. The cyber-attack 
designed to embarrass and threaten Sony initially worked, as Sony cancelled the release 
of the movie in theaters nationwide.62 
Dating back to the beginning of 2012, the Iranian government had been confirmed 
as targeting the U.S. financial institutions with persistent distributed denial of service 
attacks (DDoS). The Qassam Cyber Fighters, an organization attributed to the 
Government of Iran, states, “it is retaliating for the anti-Islamic video made in America 
                                                 
59 Ibid. 
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the United Kingdom,” accessed November 1, 2013, http://www.fbi.gov/newyork/press-releases/2010/
nyfo070710a.htm.  
61 Jack Cloherty and Pierre Thomas, “‘Trojan Horse’ Bug Lurking in Vital U.S. Computers,” ABC 
News, November 7, 2014, http://abcnews.go.com/US/trojan-horse-bug-lurking-vital-us-computers-2011/
story?id=26737476. 




that has caused protests in Muslim countries.”63 In a DDoS attack, the attacker bombards 
an online service with traffics that render it unavailable to other sources.64 In addition, in 
the banking business, online banking has become a normal, convenient, and secure way 
to bank across America. The group Cyber fighters of Izz ad-din Al quassam took 
responsibility for the attack via a Pastebin posting.65 However, “the scale, the scope and 
the effectiveness of the attacks were too sophisticated for the Cyber fighters.” U.S. 
intelligence officials were quoted as saying the group is a cover for Iran.66 The U.S. 
financial institutions, BB&T, Capital One, Citi, and Chase are some of the banks that 
have been affected by DDoS attacks.  
In September 2014, Robert Anderson, the executive assistant director for the 
FBI’s Criminal, Cyber, Response, and Services branch said during his testimony to 
Congress, “that virtually all agencies of the U.S. government have in some way been 
hacked.” Susan Spaulding, undersecretary of DHS’s National Protections and Program 
Directorate states, that in only nine months of 2014, “the National Cybersecurity and 
Communications Integration Center (NCCIC) had responded to more than 600,000 cyber 
incidents, issued more than 10,000 actionable alerts, and deployed 78 on-site teams to 
provide assistance to affected organizations.”67 The words from the FBI are very 
troubling. If the federal government computer networks are being consistently breached, 
then, how secure are SLTT government computer networks?  
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2. Terrorist  
Cyber terrorism is defined as “computer-based attacks aimed at disabling vital 
computer systems so as to intimidate, coerce, or harm a government or section of the 
population.”68 A cyber terrorist would be the individual or group performing the 
malicious cyber-attack. The December 2014 cyber attack against Sony pictures stole 
personal information for more than 6,000 Sony employees and posted four unreleased 
Sony films to the internet. A group called #GOP took credit for the attack. The attack 
threatened Sony Pictures that additional information would be stolen and released if the 
company went ahead with the release of their movie, “The Interview.”69 The plot of the 
movie revolved around an attempt to kill the leader of North Korea; hence, the supposed 
reasoning behind the #GOP targeting Sony pictures. Although North Korea denied any 
direct responsibility for the cyber-attack, the country commented on the actions by the 
#GOP as “a righteous deed of supporters and sympathizers.”70 
One of the first cases of cyber terrorism may be the Stuxnet malware that not only 
targeted computers but physically destroyed the equipment the computers controlled at 
the Natanz uranium enrichment plant in central Iran. The cyber-attack was initially 
launched against employees (a common tactic used to infiltrate a computer network) of 
industrial control system companies connected to Natanz. This sophisticated attack was 
nicknamed the world’s first digital weapon and caused centrifuges used to enrich uranium 
to fail.71  
Cyber terrorism can be performed by nation-states, criminals, or hackers in an 
effort to compromise governments, military, financial institutions, or critical 
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infrastructure assets. The opportunity space is limitless and can only be restricted by the 
capability and motivations of the cyber terrorist.  
3. Criminals  
They are known by the name Solo, Sabu, TFlow,Viral, Raven, and Xiao, just to 
name a few. They have been credited with hacking military computers, infiltrating 
telephone lines to win radio contests, creating computer worms, and hacking 
corporations, government, religious organizations, stealing identities, and using direct 
DDoS attacks against financial institutions and other corporations. Most of these groups 
or individuals are loosely organized and have little to no allegiance to one another. They 
treat cyber as a business opportunity only aligning with those temporarily to benefit a 
certain cause or particular theft. The cyber criminal has various tools and techniques at 
their disposal. Moreover, their area of operations is vast—the internet—allows for ease of 
movement, concealment of identities, recruitment, and collaboration.  
The cyber criminal is not an everyday computer geek. The cyber criminal looks at 
the return on investment (ROI) and makes a determined effort to cash in on the 
opportunity. The ability to hack into a computer from a distant location and steal 
proprietary information, PII, military plans, aerospace secrets, technology, etc,, and while 
at the same time, disguising an individual’s identity to decrease the chances of being 
caught, provides a great ROI. Many people, organizations, businesses, and countries are 
willing to pay a significant amount for the cyber criminal’s service. However, the cyber 
criminals are not the only groups and organizations looking to gain a high ROI and 
benefit from it. Hacktivist are positioned to take advantage of the same opportunities, and 
similar to the cyber criminals, they have the skills and capabilities to take advantage of 
weaknesses and vulnerabilities in computer networks. 
4. Hacktivist 
Hacktivism is a form of political motivated cyber attack and can be used to 
promote political means, human rights, government abuse of power, privacy, and 
freedom of speech to name a few. Hacktivists use several cyber-attack methods: blocking 
access to websites, defacing of websites, identity theft, virtual sit-ins, and website 
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hijacking.72 Hacktivists and terrorists can both be considered criminals. Anonymous and 
Lulzsec are considered two of the more popular hacktivist groups.73 Dating back to 2010, 
Anonymous has been credited with more than 95 cyber attacks. The attacks have been 
targeted at Sony Playstation, WikiLeaks-Operation Payback (Julian Assange), the Church 
of Scientology, Iranian elections, Arab Spring activities, U.S. banks (Empire State), 
Facebook, Wall Street, social media (Op Deepthroat), the Vatican, and the National 
Security Agency (NSA) document release to name a few.74 Anonymous appears to have 
no boundaries; the group moves throughout the world indiscriminately using the 
computer to promote a political ideology and the cyber-attack as its freedom of 
expression. 
LulzSec (Lulz Security) was a hacking group that gained notoriety with the 2011 
Sony network intrusion. The group was also known for its hacking into PBS (Public 
Broadcasting Service), Infragard and shutting down the CIA (Central Intelligence 
Agency) website. The small group organized itself by specialty (public relations, 
software tools, networks, botnets, and DDoS) and was one of the first hacking groups to 
brand itself and publicize its exploits.75 LulzSec’s success was short-lived as its leader 
Hector Monsegur, known as Sabu, was arrested by the FBI for cyber crime. It is reported 
that Sabu then helped the FBI to find and arrest some of his friends in London, New 
York, and around the world.76 This activity not only brought the activities of the group to 
an end, but it also put a dent in the operations of Anonymous. 
Groups of hacktivists are still very prevalent throughout the world. The internet is 
their area of operations, and the access and popularity of social media has enabled them 
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to scale their operations and provide a voice to their platform or political cause. The 
availability of the internet provides for unlimited possibilities and endless targets of 
opportunity.  
This chapter has focused on the cyber threat. As discussed, U.S. government 
officials have commented that China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea have all targeted the 
United States with cyber attacks. The FBI, DHS, and the intelligence community partners 
all play a role in protecting the countries’ computer networks. The combined threat posed 
by software vulnerabilities, nation-state actors, criminals, and hacktivists provide an 
increasingly tough challenge to U.S. cyber defenders. The threat is compounded by 
weaknesses in computer networks that render federal and critical infrastructure systems 
vulnerable to cyber attacks. These vulnerabilities were highlighted by the threat from 
Heartbleed, Bash, Conficker, and zero-day vulnerabilities. These challenges will not go 
away and the actions of the federal, state, and local governments, along with the 
cooperation with public and private industry, will be required to protect U.S. computer 
networks. As stated previously, if the federal government computer networks are being 
consistently breached (as stated by the FBI’s executive assistant director for cyber, 
Robert Anderson) then, how secure are SLTT government computer networks? Figure 1 
describes the evolving cyber security threat. The information highway will continue to 
grow with more and more users. If history is any indicator, the cyber threat will also 
continue to increase. The need for a comprehensive approach to cybersecurity at all levels 
of government is needed to deter the threat.  
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Figure 1.  The Growth of the Cyber Threat77 
                                                 




III. SLTT THREAT ENVIRONMENT 
Federal, state, and local governments occasionally face different forms and levels 
of cyber threats daily. A 2015 cybersecurity study, “State of Cybersecutrity in Local, 
State, and Federal Government,” conducted by the Ponemon Institute, found that federal 
agencies rely more on intelligence sharing and are more effectively recruiting expert 
cyber personnel, and that federal agencies feel their cyber programs are in the late to 
mature stage while state officials feel their programs are in the early to middle stages of 
maturity. Over the past two-years, federal agencies have faced material security breaches 
every nine weeks, while state agencies faced them every 12 weeks. Lastly, state officials 
ranked their ability to prevent, detect, contain, and recover from a cyber-attack lower than 
federal officials. Both state and federal officials agreed that one of the top cybsersecurity 
objectives is to secure critical infrastructure assets.78 
The Ponemon report points to the need for a more focused approach at the 
cybersecurity level. This approach needs to be scalable with the ability to share 
information efficiently from state to state. The information within the report identifies the 
need for an increased emphasis on ensuring SLTT entities develop a cybersecurity 
mission and implement strategies and policies designed to prevent, mitigate, and deter 
cyber threats targeted at state and local government computer networks. The remainder of 
the chapter looks at four areas of interest for every state’s cyber security focus. 
State and local government computer networks are continuously targeted by 
internal and external threats. This targeting has a direct impact on a company’s 
intellectual property, security of critical infrastructure assets, and the protection of U.S. 
citizen’s PPI.  
A. STATE GOVERNMENT 
The vulnerabilities of states can be seen in an August 2012 malicious email attack 
against the South Carolina Department of Revenue. An international hacker was able to 
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crack into the state computer and gain access to “3.8 million tax returns, including Social 
Security numbers and bank account information, in what experts say is the biggest cyber-
attack ever against a state government.”79 Cyber incidents involving PII can provide 
access to a treasure trove of information and lead to millions of records being stolen.80  
Also in 2012, the CIO for the State of Utah, Mark VanOrden, stated 
“cybercriminals attack state computer at a rate of about 20 million times per day.” This 
attack rate does not mean 20 million separate attacks but includes reconnaissance probes 
and computer automation. VanOrden went on to say, “every indication is that it (the 
attacks) will continue to accelerate.”81 
In December 2014, cyberterrorist hacked the Massachusetts State Police 
Department. The hackers gained access to the servers and locked out access to the police 
department. The criminals requested a $500 bitcoin ransom before releasing the server to 
the police department. DHS and the FBI were called in to support and identified a 
CryptoLocker malware had been present on the system since 2013. Only two options 
were available to the police department, pay the ransom or access the most recent backup 
of the database.82 The department hired a contractor to restore the database and prevent 
future attacks. However, could government networks at the local level benefit from a 
state-level cybersecurity team or group who provides updates and monitors state 
computer networks to possible prevent or mitigate attacks of this nature?  
Another example, in May 2013, the State of Washington reported a compromise 
of “up to 160,000 Social Security numbers and the names and driver’s license numbers of 
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up to 1 million people, may have been compromised.”83 The potential breech actually 
occurred earlier in the year during the late February-early March timeframe. The breech 
is damaging because it involves so much PPI.84 
“Breaches involving PII are hazardous to both individuals and organizations. 
Individual harms may include identity theft, embarrassment, or blackmail. Organizational 
harms may include a loss of public trust, legal liability, or remediation costs.”85 The 
impact of such a large amount of PPI stolen from the Department of Revenue may never 
been known. Moreover, in the 2012 Deloutte-NASCIO Cybersecurity Study,86 state CIOs 
provided the following statistics: 
Government agencies have lost more than 94 million records of citizens 
since 2009, according to a recent Rapid7 report on the Data Breaches in 
the Government Sector.87 
The average cost per lost or breached record is $194 per the Ponemon 
Institute’s 2011 Cost Data Breach Study.88 
The NASCIO study also reported that 92% of state officials feel “cybersecurity is 
very important for the state and only 24% say they are very confident in protecting state’s 
assets against external threats.”89 The reliance on computers within U.S. society will 
continue to increase. One way to increase confidence in the state’s’ ability to secure their 
networks is to ensure federal government strategies to protect the cyber domain include 
SLTT entities in the planning, development, and implementation of the various 
cybersecurity initiatives. The NASCIO study is also in favor of detailed plans for sharing 
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information and the implementation of security measures between federal and state 
information security organizations.  
B. BANKING AND FINANCE 
During an eight-month period starting in 2012 (October 2012–May 2013), several 
banks in Northeast Ohio (PNC, Key, Chase, and U.S. Bank) have been targeted by DDoS 
attacks that typically clog online and mobile access to accounts but also have the ability 
to compromise the banks’ computer system.90 
In December 2009, in the State of New York, Duanesburg Central School 
District, cyber criminals were able to transfer approximately $3 million dollars into 
overseas accounts.91 However, most of the funds were able to be recovered with the help 
of the FBI. The intent, access, and vulnerability of financial and banking assets are 
constantly under attack, especially at the local and state level where their institutions are 
not afforded the same type of security mechanisms as the larger organizations. 
Big banks and financial institutions like JPMorgan Chase & Co., Bank of 
America, Wells Fargo, Citigroup, PNC Financial Services Group and Bank of New York 
Melon have been consistently targeted over the years. As a result, they have bolstered 
their network defenses and have made it more difficult for cyber criminals to access their 
networks. Although, the threat is not gone, the banks are in a better position to prevent 
attacks and defend against the threat.  
The adversary may now shift its attention to state, regional, and local (mid-tier) 
banks and financial institutions. The main attraction is a lack of security; the mid-tier 
banks lack the finances, IT, and personnel to ensure computer network protection and 
resilience.92 The soft targets are easier to attack and with a possible lack of focus on 
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security; days, weeks, or months may go by before an intruder is detected inside the 
network.  
C. INDUSTRIAL CONTROL SYSTEMS  
Industrial control systems (ICS) are used to control critical information systems 
(power, water, natural gas, chemical, utility power, and energy systems). These systems 
are targets of opportunity from malicious actors because of the number of people that 
depend on the systems. Also, “on a daily basis, the U.S. is being targeted,”93 said Sanaz 
Browarny, from DHS Intelligence & Analysis, during a panel discussion at GovSec 
Conference on April 4, 2012. Browarny went on to describe three forms of attacks, 
“There are … those being thrill-seeking ‘garden-variety’ hackers that target known 
vulnerabilities; secondly, the dangerous volley of viruses, worms and botnet attacks; and 
thirdly, ‘nation-state actors’ that have ‘unlimited funding available’ and conduct 
espionage as they establish a hidden presence on a sensitive network.”94 
Cyber operations as previously described provide critical insight into the tactics 
and techniques of a cyber-attack against critical infrastructure assets, specifically 23 
natural gas companies. The attacker used malicious email links and file attachments that 
allowed access to company networks.95 The cyber breach and the information stolen 
leave multiple compressor stations vulnerable to destruction. William Rush, with the Gas 
and Technology Institute, said, “Anyone can blow up a gas pipeline with dynamite. But 
with this stolen information, if I wanted to blow up not one, but 1,000 compressor 
stations, I could.”96 The seriousness of the breech can be enormous to the natural gas 
industry. The cyber criminals specifically targeted the pipeline operators. The 
information they wanted to access was specific to vulnerable compressors. U.S. networks 
are consistently probed for vulnerabilities and weaknesses. Former defense secretary 
Leon Panetta warned in October 2012, “that successful attacks have been made on 
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computer control systems of American electricity and water plants and transportation 
systems.”97  
DHS reported a 52% increase in the number of attacks reported to the agency in 
2012. Of the 198 attacks reported, the two most attacked sectors were energy (82) and 
water (29). In 2013, the total number of incidents had increased to 257. In 2014, the cyber 
incidents decreased by 12 to a total of 245. In 2014, the two most attacked sectors were 
critical manufacturing (159) and energy (79). Industrial control systems are countries’ 
most critical computer networks.  
In the 2012 report, DHS detailed several successful hacking attempts targeted at 
natural gas pipeline companies where the adversary had successfully exfiltrated data.98 
The attacks on the industrial control system is severe and getting costlier by the day. It is 
apparent that a stronger cyber defense shield is needed to protect American networks 
from malicious cyber actors. ICS networks are not alone in this increased cyber attacks 
by the adversary, colleges, and universities are also under increasing attacks. 
Many states have identified their critical infrastructure assets and defined their 
points of criticality to ensure operational efficiency. The infrastructure assets are 
normally selected using criteria established DHS. The critical infrastructure assets are 
normally defined by physical and operational characteristics. The process of mapping the 
physical and operational touch points can be determined through certain criteria and asset 
interdependence. This process is tedious and time consuming but pays big dividends, as 
the final product provides a clear picture of what assets are important to the state. Now, 
once the assets are identified, how dependent are they on their computer networks or how 
vulnerable are they to cyber attacks? 
Identifying the cyber fidelity of each asset is an even tougher process to 
accomplish. What is the cyber infrastructure of the physical assets? What is the structure 
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of the computer domain and networks? Is the network protected? What security 
protection standards are utilized by the infrastructure asset owners? Has the network been 
updated with the latest protection measures? These questions are critical in determining 
the cyber fidelity of the network and the security if the critical infrastructure asset. 
D. EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 
A prime target of cyber criminals is the open network contained within the U.S. 
universities and colleges digital infrastructure. A university campus is built for 
interconnectivity and access to the world. They are in the business of openness and 
communications, built on the idea of knowledge without walls or limitations; a free-flow 
of ideas and discussions, something for everyone, including the malicious cyber actor. 
Universities have hundreds of vulnerable access points for the malicious cyber actors to 
disguise their identity, deploy their tools, and launch larger attacks against banks, critical 
infrastructure, and industrial control systems.  
Due to their mission to explore and connect their students to the world, 
universities and colleges provide an opportunity for cyber criminals to leverage their 
infrastructure to set up cyber attacks. Universities also have a tremendous amount of PII 
that can be stolen if not properly protected. The PII data is very attractive to cyber 
criminals, and if not properly protected, can be easily stolen.  
The University of Wisconsin has reported as high as 90,000 to 100,000 cyber 
hacking attempts per day by state-sponsored actors from Russia, Vietnam, and China.99 
Although, it is noteworthy, the attacks appear to originate primarily from China; many 
cyber criminals are becoming increasingly adept at disguising their identity and location. 
A technology expert from Cornell University, speaking on recent cyber hacking attempts, 
said the “the attacks are increasing exponentially in attempts and sophistication.”100 At 
the University of Maryland, more than 100,000 attempted cyberattacks were reported on 
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July 25, 2013, by early afternoon.101 Federal agencies have an important role in 
supporting colleges and universities. 
On February 20, 2014, William Loh, President, University of Maryland, 
announced in a statement, “The personal information of more than 309,000 students, staff 
and alumni of the university was compromised in a sophisticated cyber-attack … I am 
very sorry.” The cyber-attack stole students’ PPI to include student identification 
numbers, social security numbers, and birth dates. The adversary was very cunning and 
was able to access the university’s computer network even though it was protected by 
“multi-layered security defenses.”102  
In April 2015, the University of California at Berkeley was targeted by a cyber-
attack where hackers were able to steal the social security numbers from 260 former and 
current undergraduate students and 290 parents and family members of the students. One 
month later in May, Penn State University was hacked and 18,000 social security 
numbers and personal information was exposed and exfiltrated from university 
networks.103 
The NSA and DHS under a jointly sponsored program, have identified National 
Centers of Academic Excellence (CAE) in IA (Information Assurance) Education (IAE), 
the program supports colleges and universities by promoting higher education and 
research in IA. A wealth of information and research (technology, nuclear, nautical, 
aeronautic, and military, computer, etc.) is held and analyzed at these institutions of 
higher learning. It should be of utmost importance to keep this information secured from 
cyber criminals or state-sponsored actors.104 
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E. PERSONABLE IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION  
In the 2012 Deloutte-NASCIO Cybersecurity Study,105 state CIOs provided the 
following information on the value of stolen PII. In a targeted attack against the 
Department of Revenue, a large amount of PII was stolen and NASIO provided the 
following statistics: 
Government agencies have lost more than 94 million records of citizens 
since 2009, according to a recent Rapid7 report on the Data Breaches in 
the Government Sector.106 
The average cost per lost or breached record is $194 per the Ponemon 
Institute’s 2011 Cost Data Breach Study.107  
One area of increasing concern has been the introduction of the Affordable Care 
Act, which opened its government marketplace on October 1, 2013. The initial website 
difficulties identified several security network vulnerabilities that appear to be associated 
with the 14 state marketplace websites.108 Also, minor cyber breaches were identified in 
Vermont, South Carolina, and North Carolina.109 DHS’s Cybersecurity and 
Communications division reported in November 2013 that the Healthcare.gov site had 
been targeted 16 times by cyber attacks in various forms to include at least one 
unsuccessful DDoS attack.110 As more and more individuals sign up for the health 
insurance, the need for increased security to protect personal and health data will also 
increase at both the state and federal level. As a result, attempted PII data breaches will 
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probably become increasingly attractive to cyber criminals who target PII for personal, 
financial, and network intrusion purposes. 
In closing, research indicates that cyber attacks will continue to grow at the state 
and federal level. The U.S. computer network is a target-of-opportunity for state-actors 
and independent cyber criminals. Targeted attacks will continue to increase in the state 
government, education, industrial control systems, and PII areas. Many industries also 
provide prime targets, as the medical, defense, energy, financial, and government 
networks continue to be under attack by adversaries. A concerted and focused effort is 
needed prevent attacks posed by persistent cyber threats, to protect PII, financial data, 
control systems, and government networks. The failure to address this issue now leaves 
the United States vulnerable to the loss of revenue, operational interruptions, identity 
theft, loss of intellectual property, and unforeseen consequences.  
This chapter discussed the current cyber threat to the nation, to SLTT entities, and 
the cyber security policies and laws that affect the protection of federal SLTT 
governments. The impact of the threat on national security and the absence of 
overarching cyber security law directives, EOs, and memorandums of agreement to 
protect U.S. computer networks is considerable. The next chapter focuses on the response 
to the threat. 
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IV. THE RESPONSE TO THE THREAT 
The rise in cyber attacks on government, military, public and private, state and 
local networks shows that the threat to U.S. computer networks is real, consistently 
increasing, and evolving in complexity. In 2013, DHS United States Computer 
Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT) received 46,160 notifications of cyber incidents 
from 24 government agencies. The information reported by government agencies has 
increased over the past two years by 32%.111 DHS’s Industrial Control Systems-CERT 
(ICS-CERT) received 257 notifications of cyber incidents from critical infrastructure 
organizations throughout the nation. The US-CERT and ICS-CERT offer tools and 
services to federal department and agencies, critical infrastructure asset owners, state and 
local governments, and private sector stakeholders to assist with cyber incident 
protection, response, and mitigation. This daunting task falls under the authority of the 
NCCIC. The NCCIC received over 220,000 total cybersecurity and communications 
incidents in 2013.112 “The NCCIC is a 24x7 cyber situational awareness, incident 
response, and management center. The Centers mission is to reduce the likelihood and 
severity of cyber and communication incidents as it relates to the Nation’s information 
technology and communication networks.”113 The NCCIC is the federal government’s 
first-line of defense to protect .gov domain and its departments and agencies against 
cyber incidents. However, the agency is not alone. Several agencies within the cyber 
environment work together in this task to protect military and government networks and 
information. Table 1 identifies the six organizations and their mission. Each organization 
has a specific mission and capabilities. The organizations share information and 
coordinate cyber prevention, detection, mitigation, and recovery efforts. This 
                                                 
111 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Information Security: Agency Responses to Breaches of 
Personally Identifiable Information Need to Be More Consistent (GAO-14-34) (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Government Accountability Office, 2013), http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/659572.pdf. 
112 National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center, ICS-CERT Year in Review 
(Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2013), https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/
Annual_Reports/Year_In_Review_FY2013_Final.pdf. 
113 “About the National Cybersecurity & Communications Integration Center,” accessed October 16, 
2014, http://www.dhs.gov/about-national-cybersecurity-communications-integration-center.  
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collaboration between organizations is very dynamic and provides the information-
sharing foundation design to protect critical infrastructure, military, and U.S. government 
departments and agencies (D/A) networks.  
Table 1.   United States Federal Cyber Centers114 
Agency Organization Mission 
DHS / NCCIC 
– (US-CERT) 
– (ICS-CERT) 
National Cybersecurity & 
Communications Integration 
Center 










DIA / IC-SCC Intelligence Community (IC) 






status reporting for 
the IC 
FBI / NCIJTF National Cyber Investigative 









DOD / DC3 DOD Defense Cyber Crime 
Center 
Serves as focal 
point for the 
Defense Industrial 
Base (DIB) 




USCC Joint Operations 
Center 
Develops strategic 
framework for GIG 
operations. 
(continued on next page) 
                                                 
114 Data from “National Cybersecurity Center Policy Capture,” accessed December 12, 2012, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/files/documents/cyber/CybersecurityCentersGraphic.pdf.  
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Table 1 (continued from previous page) 
 
Agency Organization Mission 








As the nation goes about trying to protect its information, a key concern within 
the cyber community at the state level is deciding the best way to protect the SLTT 
organizations. The Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC) 
performs a similar function as the six previously mentioned cyber centers with its 
customers being state and local entities. The MS-ISAC is a voluntary and collaborative 
partnership with the DHS’s National Cyber Security Division to provide key resources 
for “cyber threat prevention, protection, response and recovery to the nation’s state, local, 
territorial and tribal governments.”115 The MS-ISAC serves as a key operational conduit 
between the federal government and SLTT governments. MS-ISAC operates a 24x7x365 
operations center providing real-time network monitoring, early warning, vulnerability 
identification and mitigation, and incident response for the SLTT community.116 The 
MS-ISAC has the ability to contact its members and correlate cyber attacks between 
members and organizations. The center also provides cyber advisories and threat 
reporting it receives from the NCCIC. The MS-ISAC was established in 2003. The 
connection between the federal cyber center and the state and local governments through 
the MS-ISAC has consistently grown from an information-sharing and collaboration 
aspect. The next section looks at policies and laws at the federal and state government 
levels designed to protect U.S. computer networks.  
 
                                                 
115 Multi-State Information Sharing & Analysis Center, MS-ISAC Membership Overview (East 
Greenbush, NY: Center for Internet Security, 2012), http://msisac.cisecurity.org/about/documents/MS-
ISACMembershipOverview2012.pdf. 
116 “Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center,” accessed February 13, 2014, 
http://msisac.cisecurity.org/.  
 42 
A. CYBERSECURITY POLICY 
The Cybersecurity Act of 2012 was introduced to Congress in February of that 
year. Congress was unwilling to pass the bill in 2012. However, pressure mounted as 
DDoS attacks hit major banks in 2012. In 2013, Apple, Facebook, and Twitter became 
high-profile victims of hacking. In 2014, Anonymous hacked the North Korean 
government and defaced Israeli websites. Also, in 2014, the Heartbleed bug exposed 65% 
of all internet traffic to data leaks. Finally, in 2015, the Office of Personnel Management 
(OPM) (more than 21 million were affected by the data breach117) and Sony Pictures 
Entertainment breach, and subsequent canceling of the planned release of the movie “The 
Interview,” appeared to be the tipping point to enable Congress to move and pass this 
legislation.  
President Obama signed the Cybersecurity Act of 2015 into law on December 18, 
2015. In summary, the Act requires DHS to establish a portal for receiving cyber threat 
indicators from the private sector and sharing them with both public and private sector 
entities. As an incentive, the Act “provides targeted liability protection to companies that 
share cyber threat indicators with DHS.”118 The bill limits the purpose for which the 
“government may use shared information to certain cybersecurity purposes.”119 The bill 
also requires “two layers of privacy protections: companies must remove personal 
information before sharing cyber threat indicators”120 with DHS, and DHS must 
implement privacy reviews of all indicators it receives. The bill also mandates federal 
departments and agencies deploy EINSTEIN capabilities within the next year. The bill 
gives increased authority to DHS and provides protections and incentives for private 
industry. 
For the purposes of this thesis, the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and the 
DHS Secretary  are responsible for developing procedures to share cybersecurity threat 
                                                 
117 “OPM Notifies 3.7 Million Cyber Attack Victims,” October 28, 2015, http://federalnewsradio.com/
cybersecurity/2015/10/opm-notifies-3-7-million-cyber-attack-victims-about-data-protection-services/.  
118 “Senate Report 114–32, United States Senate S.754—Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 




information with state, tribal, and local governments. This requirement provides direct 
support to SLTT entities and allows for increased emphasis on sharing information to 
protect critical government computer systems. 
B. DHS AND DOD CYBER AGREEMENT 
In 2010, current Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano and Secretary 
of Defense Robert Gates signed a memorandum of agreement (MOA) on cybersecurity 
“outlining the personnel, tools and facilities the two departments will share to improve 
collaboration on cyber activities.”121 In a joint statement, the Secretaries stated, “We will 
improve economy and efficiency by better leveraging vital technologies and personnel to 
serve both departments’ missions in full adherence to U.S. laws and regulation. This 
memorandum of agreement furthers our strong commitment to protecting civil liberties 
and privacy.”122 This cyber partnership has provided joint opportunities for collaboration 
amongst the agencies in support of cyber defense. An example is the Joint Cybersecurity 
Services Pilot, a program designed to use NSA tools and capabilities to protect defense 
industrial base (DIB) computer networks. The program works with internet service 
providers to provide protection against “Domain Name System (DNS) sink holing, which 
involves blocking DNS traffic to malicious domains, and 2) email filtering that includes 
quarantining infected messages.”123 The two cyber-attack vectors are used by adversaries 
as tools to penetrate U.S. computer networks with viruses and remove data from 
computer databases. In January 2012, DOD transferred the operational control of this 
program to DHS.124  
The partnership between the two agencies (DOD and DHS) has provided DHS the 
opportunity to offer this voluntary program to companies within all 17 critical 
infrastructure sectors. The program, which began as a proof-of-concept, has become a 
                                                 
121 “Defense and DHS Reach Cybersecurity Compromise,” accessed January 31, 2014, 
http://www.nextgov.com/cybersecurity/2010/10/defense-and-dhs-reach-cybersecurity-compromise/47758/.  
122 Ibid. 





partnership model between DOD, DHS, and private industry. The goal of the program is 
to share sensitive indicators and signatures and to utilize internet service providers to 
share cyber defense information with private industry. The DIB Opt-In Pilot program was 
renamed under DHS to the Enhanced Cybersecurity Service (ECS) program.125  
The ECS program has been under DHS operational control since 2013. The 
program provides a unique set of data that can be provided to commercial service 
providers (AT&T, CenturyLink, Lockheed Martin, and Verizon). The program currently 
offers three types of services: DNS sinkholing, email filtering, and Netflow analysis).126 
During an interview in October 2014, Dr. Andy Ozment, the DHS assistant secretary of 
the Office of Cybersecurity and Communications said, “the data [from the ECS program] 
is unique … but a challenge here is the data doesn’t lend itself to easy comparison.” He 
went on to say, “We think there is value in using this information to protect 
companies.”127  
C. DHS ENGAGEMENT 
The role of DHS in the defense of the nation’s cyber domain can be found in the 
following laws and presidential directives: Homeland Security Act of 2002 and 
Homeland Security Directive 7 (HSPD-7) tasked the Secretary of Homeland Security to: 
• Coordinate the protection of critical infrastructure and key resources 
(CIKR) throughout the nation. 
• Coordinate the protection efforts for the IT, telecommunications, and 
emergency services sectors (among others). 
• Identify one agency as the primary government representative for 
cyberspace. 
• Provide cybersecurity assistance to state and local government entities. 
                                                 
125 Department of Homeland Security, Enhanced Cybersecurity Services (Washington, DC: 
Department of Homeland Security, 2016), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/ECS-Fact-
Sheet_no%20stats_02.2016.pdf.  
126 Ibid. 
127 Jason Miller, Federal News Radio, DHS says cyber initiatives healthy and growing, October 9, 
2014, accessed on 15 October 2014, accessed from http://federalnewsradio.com/technology/2014/10/dhs-
says-cyber-initiatives-healthy-and-growing/. 
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“HSPD 5 establishes DHS’s incident management responsibilities in the event of 
a terrorist attack or presidential major disaster or emergency declaration, while HSPD-7, 
requires DHS to maintain an organization to serve as the focal point for cybersecurity 
coordination among Federal departments and agencies, State and local governments, the 
private sector, academia, and international organization.”128 
D. EXECUTIVE ORDERS AND DIRECTIVES 
Cybersecurity EO 13636 and PPD-21 leads the nation’s efforts to secure the .gov 
domain to include securing critical infrastructure networks by providing assistance to 
private sector owners and operators.129 DHS plays a critical role along with public 
private partnership to prevent, respond, and mitigate cyber attacks.130 EO 13636 works in 
conjunction with PPD-21, which replaces HSPD-7.131  
EO 13636 provides for the following:  
• Technology-neutral voluntary cybersecurity framework 
• Adoption of cybersecurity best practices 
• Increased cyber threat information sharing 
• Incorporation of strong privacy and civil liberties protections132  
PPD-21 provides for the following:  
• Providing both physical and cyber infrastructure 
                                                 
128 Ibid. 
129 “Secure Cyber Networks,” accessed January 31, 2014, https://www.dhs.gov/secure-cyber-
networks.  
130 Department of Homeland Security, Fact Sheet: EO 13636 Improving Critical Infrastructure 
Cybersecurity and PPD 21 Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience (Washington, DC: Department 
of Homeland Security, 2013), http://www.dhs.gov/publication/fact-sheet-eo-13636-improving-critical-
infrastructure-cybersecurity-and-ppd-21-critical. 
131 Critical Infrastructure: “As used in EO 13636, means systems and assets, whether physical or 
virtual, so vital to the U.S. that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would have a 
debilitating impact on security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or any 
combination of those matters.” “Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity,” accessed February 1, 
2014, https://www.federalregister.gov/articles/2013/02/19/2013-03915/improving-critical-infrastructure-
cybersecurity.  
132 Department of Homeland Security, Fact Sheet: EO 13636 Improving Critical Infrastructure 
Cybersecurity and PPD 21 Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience. 
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• Understanding infrastructure failures 
• Maturing the public-private partnership 
• Updating the National Infrastructure Protection Plan  
• Developing a comprehensive research and development plan133 
The combined implementation of the EO 13636 and PPD-21 is designed to secure 
critical infrastructure networks by identification, protection, detection, recovery, and 
mitigation through network security measures. The orders established timelines for 
implementation:  
• Expanded sharing of cybersecurity information by June 12, 2013 
• Establishment of a cybersecurity framework by October 10, 2013 
• Use of a risk-based approach to identify critical infrastructure with a 
cybersecurity impact could result in catastrophic damage by July 12, 
2013134 
This chapter has discussed the national response to the cyber threat. The 
cybersecurity strategies, policies, EOs and laws are primarily designed to support 
information sharing at the federal level and between public and private industry partners. 
The operational framework provides a standard that can be used across the cyber 
landscape to ensure specific guidelines are followed throughout the cyber community. 
However, one missing area in the strategy is the protection of SLTT government 
networks. How do the SLTT computer networks fit into the cybersecurity protection plan 
for the country? The next chapter takes a closer look at the SLTT cyber threat. 
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V. SLTT CYBER COLLABORATION 
The sophistication of cybercrime TTPs (Tactics, Techniques, and 
Procedures) is highly likely to continue to increase in 2014, with enhanced 
malware and more sophisticated delivery techniques and that financially-
motivated malware is likely to continue to dominate the SLTT threat 
picture.  
~ Center for Internet Security  
 
Many areas of the cyber domain are under attack: critical infrastructure, electrical 
grids, banks, business, government, colleges and universities and PPI (identity theft, 
medical records, credit card theft, child exploitation, etc.) of American citizens. As the 
country and the world moves towards an increasingly digitized future, state and local 
governments have become increasingly dependent upon computerized networks, digital 
storage, internet communications, and automation of critical infrastructure services 
during the daily business cycle. Since their databases and networks hold some much of 
the citizens’ PII and because they do not have the cyber protection resources afforded to 
the federal government, they are rich targets of opportunity by malicious cyber actors.  
Maryland Governor Martin O’Malley, during a panel discussion at the 2011 
National Governors Association (NGA) meeting said, “Cyber-attacks on state and federal 
databases are “one of the nation’s greatest emerging threats.” Governor O’Malley voices 
a concern shared by many governors and state CIOs, in that the cyber threat to SLTT 
entities is a top priority within their administration.  
The threats to state and local governments can be directly related to homeland 
security cyber vulnerabilities. This chapter focuses on the collaboration efforts between 
federal and state governments to protect and secure computer networks at the state and 
local level. 
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A. BUILDING PARTNERSHIPS  
DHS is chartered to provide support to SLTT entities. As a result, they have 
effectively set up a partnership environment connecting the federal government with state 
and local governments through the use of voluntary councils.  
(1) The Critical Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Council  
The (CIPAC) was established by DHS to “facilitate effective coordination 
between federal infrastructure protection programs with the infrastructure protection 
activities of the private sector and of state, local, territorial and tribal governments.”135 It 
brings together federal and SLTT entities from across the nation to partner to discuss the 
protection of critical infrastructure assets and key resources.136 
The CIPAC was chartered and signed by DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano in 
March 2010 under the authority of the Homeland Security Act of 2002. The CIKR sector 
representatives were established by HSPD-7.137 The council organizes strategies for both 
physical and cyber infrastructure protection efforts as they support CIKR resources. Since 
its organization in 2010, only 30 states currently have representatives on the council.138 
Does any correlation exist between a lack of organizational effectiveness and number of 
states participating? What is the reason for the other 20 states’ lack of representation on 
the council?  
                                                 
135 “Critical Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Council,” accessed February 5, 2014, 
http://www.dhs.gov/critical-infrastructure-partnership-advisory-council.  
136 Department of Homeland Security, Critical Infrastructure Protection Advisory Council (CIPAC) 
Charter (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2010), http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/
cipac/cipac_charter.pdf.  
137 Ibid. 
138 “State, Local, Tribal, and Territorial Government Coordinating Council: Charter and 
Membership,” April 13, 2016, https://www.dhs.gov/slttgcc-charter-and-membership.  
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(2) The Information Technology Sector Coordination Council  
The IT-SCC was established in January 2006 to bring together companies, 
associations, and other key IT sector participants to coordinate infrastructure protection, 
response, and recovery within this sector.139  
(3) The IT-Government Coordinating Council  
The IT-GCC also brings together federal and SLTT entities from across the nation 
that focus on the strategies and initiatives to help protect the technology associated with 
critical infrastructure assets.140 Together, the government coordination councils bring 
together over 200 companies from the public and private sector and over 11 federal 
government partners to meet the needs of stakeholders (business, citizens, companies, 
etc.) throughout the country.141 The IT-SCC and IT-GCC are policy councils that provide 
strategies aimed to increase collaboration and information sharing between agencies.  
(4) The Cybersecurity Partner Local Access Plan  
The CPLAP leverages state fusion centers capabilities as platforms to facilitate 
classified cybersecurity information sharing.142 The program, which began as a pilot in 
March 2010, equips fusion centers with the ability to pass secret-level information on 
cyber threats to state and local government and industry partners who have security 
clearances.143  
The CPLAP program uses existing fusion center infrastructure to law enforcement 
or homeland security partners to provide higher level of information to state and local, 
critical infrastructure, and law enforcement personnel who are classified at a certain 
security level. Classified information forwarded to fusion centers can also be downgraded 
                                                 
139 “ITSCC Overview,” accessed March 17, 2014, http://www.it-scc.org/about.html. . 
140 “DHS State Government Offerings, Products, and Services,” accessed February 9, 2014, 
http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/DHS%20State%20Resources_0.pdf.  
141 “Specific Plan 201,” accessed February 11, 2014, http://www.it-scc.org/documents/itscc/nipp-ssp-
information-tech-2010.pdf. 
142 “DHS State Government Offerings, Products, and Services.” 
143 Ben Bain, “DHS, Industry to Try Fusion Centers for Classified Data Swap,” Federal Computer 
Week, March 16, 2010, https://fcw.com/articles/2010/03/16/web-cyber-threat-fusion-center.aspx. 
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through the use of tear-line information and provided to a larger audience. Tear-line 
information allows for intelligence to be downgraded to ensure the security of sources 
and methods.  
The four programs discussed in this section are targeted to benefit information 
sharing between federal, and state and local entities. However, none of these programs 
focuses primarily on protecting SLTT networks. The information-sharing process is 
being discussed at the strategic level between senior executives. Most states have small 
IT organizations with limited security expertise. Information-sharing strategies are 
always welcomed but to deter the threat, the sharing process will need to be migrated 
from a theory to an operational plan.  
B. GOVERNMENT INFORMATION SHARING 
As discussed in Chapter II, the federal government has established federal cyber 
centers to assist in the protection of military, federal and critical infrastructure networks. 
Several programs and organization at the federal and state-level provide support to SLTT 
entities.  
1. Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC) 
The MS-ISAC is a voluntary and collaborative partnership with DHS’s NCCIC to 
provide key resources for “cyber threat prevention, protection, response and recovery to 
the nation’s state, local, territorial and tribal governments.”144 The NCCIC is a division 
of DHS’s NPPD and operates “at the intersection of the private sector, civilian, law 
enforcement, intelligence, and defense communities.”145 The NCCIC collaborates with 
SLTT governments through its close relationship with the MS-ISAC. MS-ISAC has a 
liaison representative on the NCCIC operations center floor. This representative ensures 
close collaboration between the NCCIC operations center and the MS-ISAC security 
operations center (SOC) located in East Greenbush, New York.146 
                                                 




The MS-ISAC has membership representation from all 50 states. The state 
representatives are normally chief cyber security officers, homeland security personnel, 
or law enforcement professionals. From a state perspective, the MS-ISAC has a 
representative from all 50 state capital cities. Many states also have representatives from 
within their major city locations. The MS-ISAC has representatives in U.S. territories 
(American Samoa, Guam, Puerto Rico, and U.S. Virgin Islands) and tribal nations (Gila 
River Indian Community, AZ, Morongo Band of Mission Indians, CA, Mohegan Tribe, 
CT, and Choctaw Nation, OK) in an attempt to expand their outreach throughout all areas 
of SLTT governments147 
NCCIC’s relationship with the federal cyber centers and its unique relationship 
with the MS-ISAC allows for the collaboration of cyber threats, warnings, advisories, 
vulnerabilities, mitigation, and incident response capabilities at a high level of 
collaboration within the cyber domain. However, can the cyber support be more efficient, 
incorporate a more targeted threat response, or be developed to allow SLTT governments 
to implement the cyber procedures received from federal government partners? 
The MS-ISAC partnership with SLTT governments is important not only in the 
security of their networks, but it also has mutual value to federal partners when analytical 
collaboration provides actionable indicators and targeted analysis leads to the building of 
signatures and countermeasures to deter or prevent future attacks and threats. The 
collaboration process is great but the process falls short if the SLTT government 
stakeholders do not have the capability to process the data or implement the 
recommended cyber procedures. 
2. Cyber Security Advisor Program (CSA) 
“CSAs act as principal field liaisons in cybersecurity and provide a Federal 
resource to regions, communities, and businesses. Equally important is their role in 
supporting cybersecurity risk management efforts at the State and local homeland 
security initiatives. Their primary goal is to assist the Nation’s critical infrastructure and 
                                                 
147 “Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center.” 
 52 
key resources (CI/KR).”148 The program is run by DHS’ Cybersecurity and 
Communications (CS&C) Strategic Engagement and Cyber Infrastructure Resilience 
(SECIR) Division and is structured in the same manner as the Protective Security 
Advisor (PSA) program run by DHS’s Infrastructure Protection Division. The CSA 
program focuses on cyber security while the PSA program focuses on physical security. 
The CSAs projects the capabilities of the NCCIC to be extended to state and local 
governments.149 The primary goal of this program is to bolster the cybersecurity 
infrastructure of CIKR assets within specific Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA) regions (shown in Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2.  Fusion Center Regional Areas150 
                                                 
148 “Cybersecurity and Communications (CS&C),” accessed February 13, 2014, https://www.dhs.gov/
xlibrary/assets/pso_cat_csc.pdf.  
149 Office of Cybersecurity and Communications, CSA Security Advisor Initiative Pre-Decisional 
Implementation Plan (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2014), 5. 
150 Source: “Regional Contacts,” accessed April 8, 2013, http://www.greatdreams.com/political/
RegionalContacts.jpg.  
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Currently, four CSAs are deployed within the FEMA regions. The goal was to 
have one CSA deployed to each region, for a total of 10, by the end of 2015. CSAs work 
closely with CISOs. They serve as an additional capability within fusion centers and 
within state and local emergency operations centers (EOCs). In addition, they are a 
conduit between CS&C and the SLTT and private industry.151 CSAs normally perform a 
particular, non-operational role when notified and directed by federal officials and at the 
request of state, local, and private sector emergency managers. From a cyber notification 
and response perspective, the CSAs do not perform response actions directly. They 
normally provide assistance with on-site and front-line damage control, notification and 
outreach to the national sector, on-site command and control of cyber first responders, 
and on-site contingency plan activation, monitoring, and oversight.152 Cyber security 
advisors are deployed from the Cyber Security Evaluation Program (CSEP).153 The 
CSEP performs cyber resilience reviews (CRRs) that measure adoption of maturity 
aspects of cybersecurity risk management using a common, capability-based 
framework.154 This process improvement model was developed by Carnegie Mellon 
University’s Software Engineering Institute for managing operational resilience.  
CSAs are primarily advisors from the federal government to facilitate 
cybersecurity assistance as needed to state and local governments. The role of the CSA 
and their relationship with CISOs and CIOs provide needed support to protecting cyber 
infrastructure at the state and local level. However, can the role of the CSA be bolstered 
to provide hands-on operational cyber support? The CSA’s role as a facilitator and senior 
representative interacting with CISOs and CIOs are surely needed. Moreover, an 
additional responsibility to provide direct cyber operational support will also increase 
efficiency and provide much needed resource for cyber threat prevention, protection, 
response, and recovery to the nation’s SLTT governments.  
                                                 
151 Office of Cybersecurity and Communications, CSA Security Advisor Initiative Pre-Decisional 
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152 Ibid., 7. 
153 Ibid., 4. 
154 “DHS State Government Offerings, Products, and Services.” 
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3. National Guard 
The National Defense Authorization Act signed in December 2013 and the Cyber 
Warrior Act of 2013 provide for the use of the National Guard in a cyber defense role in 
support of the states in case of a cyber disaster. The State of Washington was one of the 
first to embrace this initiative by using the guard for cyber emergency “planning and to 
search for vulnerabilities in its state networks through ‘red team’ exercises.”155 High-tech 
companies in Washington like Google, Microsoft, Cisco, Hewlett-Packard, and others 
provided the state with a wealth of Guard soldiers working in technology companies 
every day. They were current in the cyber threat and the technology used to prevent and 
deter cyber attacks. The guard provides a unique military prospective on cybersecurity 
with possible direct connections to training and capabilities through the NSA and U.S. 
Cyber Command (USCC).  
In March 2013, a group of eight senators introduced a bill that would establish 
National Guard led, cybersecurity civil support teams, under the direction of the governor 
of the state. The teams could be activated in response to a major cyber-attack.156 When 
discussed with General Keith B. Alexander, Director of the NSA and Commander of 
USCC, General Alexander responded, “we are actively working this issue with the 
Guard, he went on to explain how he had presented the idea to all of the adjutant generals 
from all the states and walked them through the process of standards and training.”157 
The ability to leverage the experience of IT professionals at a fairly low-cost is a very 
attractive option in the fight against malicious cyber actors and criminals.  
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In addition to the state of Washington, five other states (Missouri, Maryland, 
Delaware, Utah, and Rhode Island) have all established cyber response teams.158 The 
states believe Guard mobilization against cyber attacks can play a critical role in the 
defense of state and local networks. This initiative gained momentum during 2013–14 
due to the lack of movement by Congress to pass a comprehensive cybersecurity bill that 
will protect both federal and state and local networks. As stated by Colorado Governor 
(John Hickenlooper (D), during his “State of the States” speech at the National Governors 
Association in January 2014, “While the federal government seeks to clarify how it will 
work with private sector and states to better secure cyberspace, states are already moving 
forward to develop and implement new cyber policies to protect their economies and 
ensure public safety.”159  
The National Guard has the potential to provide a low-cost and effective cyber 
threat, mitigation, and recovery alternative for the nation’s SLTT governments. This 
initiative can leverage the cyber capabilities of DHS and the FBI possibly to form a team 
of cyber defenders that can provide targeted cyber support and mutual value to state and 
local government, as well as value to the federal government. 
In closing, it should be noted, DHS has a three page list of products and services 
available to SLTT entities. The services provided specific information on collaboration, 
information sharing, classified data sharing, evaluations and assessments, software 
assurance, and exercises and training to name a few. The services are mostly free of 
charge and are provided to ensure cybersecurity information is forwarded and 
collaborated at all levels of government.  
This chapter examined the cyber threat and the seriousness of the threat to state 
and local governments. It discussed the various programs, partnerships, and the 
accompanying policies that allow federal government assets, information, and 
capabilities to be leveraged by SLTT governments. A variety of programs are targeted at 
                                                 
158 Kevin McCaney, “Got a Cyber Emergency? Call out the National Guard,” Defense Systems, 
January 30, 2014, http://defensesystems.com/articles/2014/01/30/national-guard-cyber-response.aspx.  




different aspects of the problem set (securing SLTT government networks). In 
conclusion, the previous example demonstrates the variety of programs available to 
SLTT entities, and as stated section 1, only 24% of state CIOs are very confident in 
protecting states’ assets against external threats, even with all the information-sharing 
initiatives and tools provided by the federal government.  
Chapter V looks at state and local fusion centers and examined if fusion centers 
are a viable option to protect SLTT computer networks. 
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VI. FUSION CENTERS: MISSION AND OPPORTUNITY 
As discuss earlier, fusion centers are designed to receive, analyze, disseminate, 
and gather information. Chapter four documents visits to fusion centers in Maryland and 
San Francisco and discusses the mission of the Delaware and Virginia fusion centers. The 
visits were designed as an information gathering process. An opportunity to review 
firsthand the mission of the fusion centers and ascertain through a review of the 
operations tempo, operational procedures, operational relationships between the federal 
and local governments, mission delegation, governing documents, and overall mission 
process. A review of this material also provides an assessment of the fusion centers’ 
ability to absorb an additional cybersecurity mission. The fusion center information that 
follows is based upon the author’s visit to the centers. 
A. THE HISTORY OF FUSION CENTERS 
The Homeland Security Act of 2002 created DHS. The President was required to 
“implement procedures for Federal agencies to share classified and unclassified 
homeland security information with appropriate State and local personnel (including 
private-sector entities).”160 Fusion centers were designed to serve as a primary state and 
local information-sharing organization between the federal government, state and local, 
and public and private sector.161 
In 2004, the 9/11 Commission Report was released. The Commission highlighted 
the failure of public officials to “connect the dots.” The inability of the federal and state 
intelligence and law enforcement officials to identify and prevent the threat was highly 
                                                 
160 National Infrastructure Advisory Council, Intelligence Information Sharing, Final Report and 
Recommendations (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2012), http://www.dhs.gov/
xlibrary/assets/niac/niac-intelligence-information-sharing-final-report-01102012.pdf. 
161 “National Network of Fusion Centers Fact Sheet,” accessed January 15, 2014, 
https://www.dhs.gov/national-network-fusion-centers-fact-sheet#1.  
 58 
criticized and led to an increased emphasis for government organizations to share 
information.162 
In 2005, a meeting of the NGA led to the publishing of a 2006 survey of state 
homeland security advisors and “found that developing a state intelligence fusion center 
ranked as their third priority.” The survey and conclusions followed a 2005 Homeland 
Security Advisory Council (HSAC) meeting in March 2005 that found, “each state 
should establish an information center that serves as a 24/7 ‘all source’, multi-
disciplinary, information fusion center.”163 
In 2006, Charles Allen, Under Secretary for DHS’s Office of Intelligence and 
Analysis submitted a fusion center plan of action to then DHS Secretary Michael 
Chertoff. Charlie Allen outlines the fusion centers’ potential to aid federal counter-
terrorism efforts. In the memorandum, Mr. Allen stated, “We need the capability to 
routinely harvest information and finished intelligence in a timely manner from State and 
Local sources.” And fusion centers were “one of the most important endeavors the 
Department can undertake right now.”164 Secretary Chertoff signed off on the plan later 
that year, and the fusion center concept took on increased level of energy in the number 
of centers created and the monetary funds allotted to the program.  
B. NUMBER OF FUSION CENTERS IN THE NATIONAL NETWORK 
As of September 1, 2007, 58 fusion centers were either operating of being 
established. By the end of 2011, there were 77 fusion centers within the 
National Network, and with the January 2013 designation of a fusion 
center in Guam, there are no 78: 52 State and territorial and 26 Major 
Urban Area fusion centers. CHS SLFC Report 2013 Final165 
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In 2008, a CRS report to Congress entitled Fusion Centers: Issues and Options 
for Congress, identified four fusion center value propositions: 
• Intelligence, and the intelligence process, plays a vital role in preventing 
terrorist attacks 
• The fusion of a broader range of data, including non-traditional source 
data, is essential in creating a more comprehensive threat picture. 
• State, local, and tribal law enforcement and public sector agencies are in a 
unique position to make observations and collect information that may be 
central to the DNI’s annual threat assessment. 
• Having fusion center activities occur at the sub-federal level can benefit 
state and local communities, and possibly, has national benefits as well.166 
In 2009, DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano said during her speech at the Council of 
Foreign Relations, “Fusion centers are and will be a critical part of our nation’s homeland 
security capabilities. I intend to make them a top priority for this Department to support 
them, build them, improve them and work with them.”167 With the increase in support for 
the fusion centers, some have also rebuffed the mission and worth of the centers. 
Although, six years later, a review of the value propositions previously listed states that a 
cyber mission uniquely fits into the fusion center operational mission.  
C. FUSION CENTERS—A CYBER MISSION 
In July 2013, discussions concerning fusion centers relating to the Majority Staff 
Report on the National Network of Fusion Centers from the Committee on Homeland 
Security and the October 3, 2012, U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigation, 
found “that DHS’ work with those state and local fusion centers has not produced useful 
intelligence to support federal counterterrorism efforts.”168 The Senate report is 
completely contrary to the March 2012 NPR, which key findings stated, “A network of 
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state and major urban fusion centers and Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) has 
significantly improved analytical and information sharing capabilities among law 
enforcement, homeland security, and Intelligence Community entities at all levels of 
government.”169 The NPR used a survey to obtain its analysis. The Subcommittee on 
Investigations reviewed reports, visited fusion centers, and analyzed budget decisions, in 
comparison to DHS requirements. Although the Subcommittee report is very critical of 
the fusion centers, the recommendation section holds optimism that the problems can be 
corrected. 
The first recommendation by the Senate Subcommittee on Investigations was for 
DHS to “conform its efforts to match its counterterrorism statutory purpose, or redefine 
DHS’ fusion center mission.”170 From a cyber mission perspective, the fusion center 
profile has the authority, organizational structure, organizational collaboration 
framework, personnel, and mission delegation to absorb a cybersecurity mission for the 
protection of SLTT governments’ computer networks. Throughout the country, several 
fusion centers have the infrastructure and operational processes in place to incorporate a 
cyber mission. The next section reviews these fusion centers. 
1. Fusion Centers—Cybersecurity Today 
The Cyber Intrusion Center (City of Los Angeles) launched in 2013 and builds 
upon the work of 2012 Naval Postgraduate School Center for Homeland Defense and 
Security graduate John Zambri, Los Angeles, California Police Department Detective in 
building the foundation and establishing the Cyber Intrusion Command Center (CCIC) 
operational structure.171 The center is controlled by the Los Angeles Police Department 
(LAPD). The 24/7 cyber center has inventoried all the government-owned computer 
networks and is in the process of patching and hardening its infrastructure. The city also 
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monitors all physical police activity throughout the city.172 The center provides a model 
for the combined interaction of cyber and physical security. 
In January 2013, the state of New Jersey opened its Cyber Fusion Cell within its 
Regional Operation Intelligence Center. The Cyber Fusion Cell focuses on sharing cyber 
threat information by working with the public and private sector. The cyber effort is led 
by the state CIO and has initiated a series of exercises to test its processes and 
procedures. The state uses its own assets to monitor and harden government computer 
networks. The Cyber Fusion Cell reports information using a tool called the “Suspicious 
Activity Reporting System,” the same alerting system used by law enforcement that 
provides for increased collaboration and unity of effort.173 
In Michigan, during the state’s 2013 Cyber Summit, Governor Rick Snyder 
introduced a volunteer IT force to help the state deal with cyber attacks. The governor’s 
goal was to provide a broader network of cyber responders.174 In June 2014, Michigan 
had built the small volunteer corps into a group of trained cyber experts. The program is 
called the Michigan Cyber Civilian Corps (MIC3). The group correlates cyber 
information with government, private, education, and business sectors.175 
In February 2013, The Louisiana State Analytical and Fusion Exchange (LA-
SAFE) responded to a sheriff’s department request that its telephone lines were 
intentionally being flooded with 200 telephone calls per minute (DDoS attacks), 
rendering its 911 service inoperable. LA-SAFE released an advisory through the fusion 
centers, municipal agencies, critical infrastructure network, and law enforcement. The 
collaboration revealed over 500 such attacks occurring across the nation. The successful 
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collaboration led to the establishment of a national task force to identify and find those 
responsible. LA-SAFE’s cyber division was formed in response to the Conficker worm in 
2009.176  
In November 2013, the New York State Intelligence Center relocated to the 
Center for internet Security (CIS). “CIS is a global non-profit organization whose 
mission is to enhance cybersecurity readiness and response of the public and private 
sectors.”177 The relocation of the intelligence center with the cyber organization “creates 
a joint operations and analytical unit to more effectively analyze and respond to cyber-
occurrences.”178 This concept is a model partnership for fusion centers to absorb a cyber 
mission. The ability to collaborate with a nonprofit organization provides a strategy to 
leverage existing capabilities to reduce cost, strengthen partnerships, and coordinate 
SLTT computer network protection.  
Two initiatives at the federal-level has also proven that the fusion center model 
has the capability to absorb a cyber mission. The next section reviews the DHS Fusion 
Center Pilot concept and the National Guard’s cyber security civil support team strategy.  
2. Federal Support to the SLTT Cyber Mission  
The 2014 DHS Fusion Center Pilot (mature cyber capability) is a concept similar 
to the main thrust of this thesis. The Pilot is designed to develop a specific fusion center 
framework to assess the viability of absorbing a cyber mission into the center. The Pilot 
is currently designed to leverage mature fusion centers in San Francisco, CA, Baton 
Rouge, LA, Kansas City, MO, Madison WI, and East Greenbush, NY. The concept 
includes an advisory board that has identified 10 tasks to be implemented in the initiative. 
The tasks range from information sharing and training to a detailed budget. The Pilot has 
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been signed by representatives from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence 
(ODNI), DHS, NFCA (National Fusion Center Association), IACP (International 
Association of Chiefs of Police), and CIS. The success of the pilot will be released in an 
upcoming report.  
3. Cyber Security Civil Support Teams (National Guard) 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the Cyber Warrior Act of 2013 would set up 
Cyber and Computer Network Incident Response Teams (CCNIRTs) in each of the 50 
states and four U.S. territories. CCNIRTs, once activated by the governor or secretary of 
defense, will respond to a cyber attacks.179 As discussed, the states believe Guard 
mobilization against cyber attacks can play a critical role in the defense of state and local 
networks. The ability to leverage the experience of IT professionals at a fairly low-cost is 
a very attractive option in the fight against malicious cyber actors and criminals. The key 
advantage to this concept is the governor is involved in the decision-making process. For 
the cyber teams to be activated, the governor must have knowledge of the details of the 
cyber event. The disadvantage, the cyber attack has already happened; the activity is by 
nature reactive, and no prevention stage occurs. The key is to understand the TTPs of the 
cyber actor and use the TTPs to prevent future threats.  
4. Challenges to the Fusion Center Cyber Mission 
A report by the Ponemon Institute in October 2015 identified 86% of respondents 
in state and local government believe the responsibility for managing cybersecurity risk 
in their organizations is the most stressful job they have.180 This stress is impacted by 
many characteristics but this study reviews three key attributes: budget, personnel, and 
organizational plans.  
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The typical SLTT entity “spends less than 5% of its IT budget on 
cybersecurity.”181 Although, the state of Michigan increased its budget by $5 million in 
2016, a 2.4% increase in cybersecurity.182 Every state places a different priority on cyber. 
This priority normally is directly related to their budget. States need to focus on 
cybersecurity through their budget and cybersecurity professionals to protect their 
networks and sensitive information. 
b. Personnel 
With the continuous increase in internet usage, experienced cyber security 
personnel are needed. This need is at the federal and state level. However, a look at the 
state challenge was identified in a 2015 report by the National Association of State Chief 
Information Officers, which surveyed 49 state CIOs concerning the challenge to hire and 
retain cybersecurity personnel. The following statistics are provided: 
• Nearly 92% of states say salary rates and pay grade structures present a 
challenge in attracting and retaining IT talent. 
• 86% of states are having difficulty recruiting new employees to vacant IT 
positions. 
• 46% of states report that it is taking 3–5 months to hire senior level IT 
positions. 
• A shortage of qualified candidates for state IT positions is hindering 66% 
of states from achieving strategic IT initiatives. 
• Security is the skill that presents the greatest challenge in attracting new 
employees.183  
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A 2015 study by the Pell Center entitled, State of the States on Cybersecurity, 
identified where the state stands in its maturity and commitment to cybersecurity based 
on five operational areas: state cybersecurity strategic plans, incident response, E-crime 
and law enforcement, information sharing, and cyber R&D, education, and capacity 
building.184 If states had established any progress in these areas, they were given at least 
partial credit during the assessment. A total of eight states (CA, MD, MI, NJ, NY, TX, 
VA, and WA) were selected to participate in the assessment based upon the states’ 
priority on cybersecurity. The results of the assessment identified gaps within each state, 
but mostly within the strategic plan area. Each state had gaps in most of the evaluation 
areas, with Michigan appearing the most prepared amongst all eight states. This study 
would be effective for every SLTT entity, as the assessment methodology allows the state 
to perform an evaluation of its cybersecurity operational space. The assessment provides 
practical ways for state and local governments to take inventory of their cyber assets, 
strategies, and policies.  
This chapter looked at the fusion centers’ mission and provided examples of 
several fusion centers throughout the United States that have absorbed a cyber mission. 
The analysis provided an examination of why fusion centers were created and the 
realization of utilizing fusion centers in the fight to protect SLTT computer networks. 
The fusion center mission is designed to defend the nation and the states against 
emerging threats. In addition, the cybersecurity arena is no longer just an emerging threat. 
U.S. computer networks are being attacked from all angles. SLTT computer networks 
will undoubtedly become an increasing target of opportunity for the cyber criminals, 
hackers, extremists, or nation-state actors. As stated earlier, the NASCIO study reported 
that only 24% of state officials say they are very confident in protecting their states’ 
computer assets against external threats.185 With only 24%, how can the confidence level 
of state CIO’s be increased? The next chapter discusses protecting SLTT computer 
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networks by utilizing fusion centers to incorporate a cyber mission by infusing cyber 
security teams into fusion centers specifically to perform this function. Why specific 
cyber security teams? The answer goes back to 2006 when the U.S. Department of Justice 
developed the fusion center guidelines. The process of securing SLTT computer networks 
will be enhanced if all fusion centers establish a cyber mission designed to protect the 
states’ computer networks and share computer-related threat information across the 
country. All fusion centers should incorporate a baseline cyber framework that includes 
infrastructure, personnel, reporting capability, incident response capability, intrusion 
detection capability, and information sharing with state, local, and federal partners. 
Chapter VII explores the incorporation of an adjunct cyber mission for fusion centers 
across the United States in an effort to protect SLTT computer networks. 
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VII. FUSION CENTERS: A CYBER INITIATIVE 
As discussed throughout this thesis, the cyber threat today is constantly evolving 
and has a direct impact on America’s national security. Cyber criminals are continually 
looking for new and inventive ways to access government files, steal intellectual 
property, access banking system data, steal PPI through retail outlets (e.g., Target and 
Lowe’s), health care sponsors (Anthem), industry organizations (Sony), government 
organizations (OPM) and educational institutes (University of Maryland) to name a few. 
A review of the literature details various strategies, collaboration efforts, and plans to 
assist SLTT entities in their defense of cyber networks. The problem is no standard cyber 
blueprint or unity of effort exists amongst the fusion centers to incorporate a cyber 
mission. Several ideas have been pulled together depending upon state or local needs and 
current operational capability. What is lacking is a consolidated strategy and framework 
on how to best incorporate the cyber threat faced by SLTT entities. This chapter proposes 
a strategy to overcome this challenge. 
A. CRYPTOLOGIC SUPPORT TEAMS 
In 2007, during the second Iraq War, at the onset of the “surge” of U.S. military 
ground forces, the United States also made a change to its intelligence collection efforts. 
This collection focus allowed the United States to gain the tactical advantage in the war. 
A change in leadership at the combat support agencies led to a change in strategy to 
implement new technology and innovation tools that enhanced the TTPs from lessons 
learned on the battlefield. The United States initiated an intelligence-driven operations 
model that was highly effective.186 Can this cryptologic support group concept be 
incorporated in fusion centers to leverage the federal government capabilities and tackle 
the cyber challenge? 
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The CSG concept was designed by the U.S. intelligence community to provide 
dedicated intelligence support to military commanders or other U.S. government 
departments or agencies during a time of war or crisis.  
The CSG organizational construct can either be distinct and centrally located 
within the customer space to provide broad support to a customer across a range of 
cryptologic issues, or a combination of centrally located entities along with individuals 
integrated into a specific regional and functional area to provide subject matter expertise 
within the customer environment. 
Customer relations functions include facilitate the intelligence process, provide 
intelligence expertise to a customer or region, educate the customer, provide direct reach 
back to home base, and provide direct 24x7 watch operations support. Can this 
cryptologic support groups concept can possibly be utilized to help protect cybersecurity 
networks of SLTT governments? 
B. CYBERSECURITY SUPPORT TEAMS 
This thesis proposes a concentrated effort to integrate cyber teams into fusion 
centers. This concept requires a baseline cyber team to be established with a fusion 
center. The teams will be built using current federal staffing with additional staffing hired 
by the state and local government. Training will be required to ensure cyber teams are 
trained to a specific standard and incorporated directly into the fusion center with the 
authority and ability to provide direct support through dynamic cyber defense capabilities 
with tools and cyber intelligence leveraged from federal government cyber centers. The 
ability to leverage federal cyber center assets to provide a focused dynamic defense 
capability directly to SLTT assets through the fusion center is an option discussed in the 
previous chapter and is being utilized today.  
The initial core capability would focus on the following five mission areas: state 
government, education, health care, banking and finance, and critical infrastructure 
networks. The protection of PII would be given maximum security consideration within 
the five mission areas.  
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The improved intelligence capabilities allowed the coalition forces to be proactive 
rather than reactive. An adjustment in TTPs allowed for the disruption of activities during 
the planning or implementation phase of the adversaries operations. When knowing and 
understanding the adversary’s TTPs, it is easier to disrupt prior to an incident or set up 
traps and lay in anticipation of the adversaries moves.187 
The use of signals intelligence (SIGINT) during the first Gulf War is a key aspect 
of the intelligence driven operations model that is a viable option in the fight against 
cyber terrorism. NSA pushed cryptologic support teams down to the battalion level to 
provide direct support to the theater and the commanders on the battlefield. The 
advantage was that intelligence was more timely and relevant. Moreover, because NSA 
was controlling the intelligence process, it was able to synergize operations effectively. 
Another key advantage was the feedback loop, with weekly meetings and video 
teleconferences, collection and mitigation that allowed for an active sharing of critical 
information. This concept of deploying cryptologic support teams forward also played a 
big role (with the same success rate) in Afghanistan. One of the challenges of forward 
deployed teams in Afghanistan was the sharing of intelligence without divulging 
sensitive collection methods.188 
The concept of forward deployed cryptologic support teams can be utilized within 
the cyber domain to provide cyber support to SLTT governments. The success of an 
intelligence driven operational model that controls and synergizes dynamic cyber 
defensive engagement, targeted at specific TTPs, can be utilized in fusion centers around 
the country to deter the threat and protect sensitive networks.  
C. A NEW APPROACH 
As detailed in Chapter II, nation-state actors, terrorists, criminals, and hacktivists 
are targeting U.S. computer networks at a constant and increasing rate. State and local 
government officials have only a 24% confidence level that they can protect their 




computer networks from attack. The cyber threat to the U.S. is growing and described in 
Figure 1.  
(1) Policy Development and Legal Framework 
This agreement or understanding is critical for operational success. The 
Cybersecurity Defensive Engagement Support Teams (CDEST) should have the authority 
to provide direct support to SLTT stakeholders. The primary success of the concept is to 
allow the teams direct access to state government networks. The only way to achieve this 
goal is under direct authority of the governor. The teams will be operationally organized, 
using existing manpower from federal, law enforcement, state and local, and if needed, 
National Guard personnel. The governor or the state chief information actor (acting on 
behalf of the governor) will provide oversight and direct cybersecurity support to the 
state’s computer networks. The teams will function under the same authorities as the 
current personnel. 
(2) Federal and State Relationships 
A MOA should be established between the state governor and the Secretary of 
Homeland Security. This agreement is similar in purpose, scope, mission, and 
responsibilities as signed in 2010 between DHS and DOD. The agreement encourages 
interdepartmental collaboration, “mutual support for cybersecurity development, and 
synchronization of current operational cybersecurity mission activities.”189 The governor 
has the power to control state-owned assets. The CDEST is designed to provide hands-on 
cyber support to state-owned assets (state government, educational institutions, banking 
and financial institutions) (regulated by state government), health care exchanges, and 
critical infrastructure assets. If a state-owned or operated institution (e.g., University of 
Maryland) is involved in a cyber-attack, the CDEST will have the authority to go to the 
University of Maryland and take the lead role in determining the identification, detection, 
mitigation, and recovery of the computer network. Through collaboration efforts, the 
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CDEST will provide training, collaboration, system testing, and network resilience 
efforts to strengthen and fortify networks.   
(3) Infrastructure Assessment 
The 74 fusion centers spread across the nation are all at different levels of 
operational maturity, cyber maturity, personnel maturity, and mission capability. These 
levels of maturity and capability will be addressed as the CDEST teams are deployed to 
the fusion centers. However, prior to deployment, a certain level of physical and 
information infrastructure is required to be in place. 
(4) Physical Infrastructure (Facility Assets, Communication Security) 
The facility should be equipped to handle all three levels of information 
(unclassified, secret, and top secret). The facility would conform to DoDM 5105.21-Vol 
1–3, Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) Administrative Manual and 
Intelligence Community Standard Number 705–1 (ICS 705–1) Physical and Technical 
Security Standard for Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities (SCIF) (Effective: 
17 September 2010). The facility should be accredited and TEMPEST tested. A benefit 
concerning the physical infrastructure requirements are many fusion centers have been 
built to SCIF standards.190 The positive aspects of the facilities’ physical infrastructure 
also provide for greater access to information data sources without incurring additional 
cost.  
(5) Identify Data Sources 
All fusion centers should have access to a general suite of communication data 
sources. Access to unclassified information through the MS-ISAC (cyber threat 
reporting) and NCCIC (cyber information sharing portal G-FIRST) is required. Access to 
secret information through the DHS’ Homeland Secure Data Network (HSDN) network 
and FBI’s Guardian Automated Case Support (ACS) network is required. Access to top 
                                                 




secret information is required through the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications 
System (JWICS) network and FBI’s SCI Operational Network (SCION) network is 
required. These information sources provide a basic level of communication data sources 
that will allow for efficient operational information sharing activities.  
(6) Enhance the Reporting Network 
The information data sources noted previously allow for the construction of 
efficient information-sharing processes with the six federal cyber centers through the 
MS-ISAC. As discussed in Chapter III, the MS-ISAC was established to provide cyber 
information sharing and cybersecurity defense directly to SLTT entities.  
The federal cyber centers can communicate directly with the fusion centers for 
time-sensitive information or through the MS-ISAC during normal reporting and analysis 
procedures. This process is very similar to the Interagency Sharing Environment (ISE) 
Interagency Threat Assessment and Coordination Group (ITACG) framework. The 
mission will dictate reporting requirements and be flexible enough to surge 
communication avenues when needed.  
(7) Build Cybersecurity Teams 
The CDEST team should include the main key skill sets, as described in the 
Cyber Security and Information Assurance Green Hat Philosophy. The skill set includes 
incident response, critical infrastructure protection, containment, eradication, and 
recovery, malware analysis, resilience and business continuity. These skill sets are 
universal (with some variations) throughout the cyber security and information assurance 
industry. The structure and skill set of the team will incorporate known cybersecurity 
experience. The need for a well-rounded team is essential for operational success. The 
team of experts should have the ability to work hand-in-hand with SLTT stakeholders. 
The team will have the authority of the governor and Secretary of Homeland Security. 




Figure 3.  Fusion Center Cyber Responsibilities191 
(8) Identify Cybersecurity Training 
The training effort will be designed to familiarize the team with the federal cyber 
security centers, SLTT stakeholders, ISACs, and the organizations within the ISEs. 
Specific training will incorporate access and utilization of the data sources referenced 
above. The need to leverage the data sources for the good of the SLTT stakeholders is 
one of the primary goals of the team.  
D. IMPACT TO THE SLTT GOVERNMENTS 
The goal of this strategy is to integrate CDEST s directly into state and major 
urban area fusion centers. The CDEST teams will provide direct cybersecurity support to 
                                                 
191 Adapted from “Information Assurance Philosophy—Green Hat, Cyber Security and Information 












SLTT governments. The teams will have the authority to interact with cybersecurity 
defense, mitigation, recovery, and prevention. The primary advantage would be the 
synthesis of the state and local government stakeholders to provide a robust dynamic 
cyber defense capability from the bottom-up.  
E. VALUE PROPOSITION AND RISK 
The introduction of a dedicated cybersecurity mission into the fusion centers will 
allow for a dynamic cyber defense capability, interactive information-sharing process 
between the federal government and SLTT governments, and a whole-of-government 
approach to protecting the nation’s cyber networks. This cybersecurity framework and 
strategy will provide value at both the state and federal level of government, as shown in 
Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4.  Cyber Fusion Center Value Proposition 
 
(1) Value to SLTT Government 
SLTT entities will benefit greatly from dedicated cyber personnel imbedded 
directly into the fusion centers. The personnel will benefit from a robust policy and 
governance between the governor and the Secretary of Homeland Security. The authority 
from the governor allows the cyber security teams to work directly (and if needed onsite) 
with the stakeholders’ cybersecurity teams. This face-to-face interaction is a 360-degree 
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change from the current process in which many fusion centers currently have no cyber 
personnel onsite. The fusion centers with no cyber personnel are basically transit centers 
used to push the information to organizations or personnel of interest. In this new 
framework, cyber information will be processed and analyzed for actionable information, 
the data can be provided directly to stakeholders, and the cyber personnel can work 
directly onsite to ensure the proper application of the information or identification of 
threats to the computer network. The framework has the potential to build a sustained 
cyber defense and collaboration effort that is greatly needed to protect SLTT government 
networks.  
(2) Value to the Federal Government 
A framework that allows actionable cybersecurity information to be shared and 
acted upon with SLTT governments is a win-win for federal government partners. Many 
times, information is shared with SLTT government entities, but because of information 
security barriers, the classification level of the information, and the ability to share 
information with cybersecurity personnel in a position to act on the data, the information-
sharing process breaks down. A framework to share actionable data, at all three 
classification levels to cybersecurity teams with the ability to act as a standalone defense 
mechanism, or in-conjunction with the cyber teams affected by the unwanted network 
intrusion, or the ability to share defensive strategies to prevent the threat, is critical to the 
protection of computer networks at all levels of government. This enhanced level of 
cooperation allows for indications and warning prior to an intrusion and helps the federal 
government be proactive in its cyber defense engagement rather than reactive. 
(3) Mutual Value 
The mutual value of the imbedded cyber security teams in fusion centers is the 
ability to enact a whole-of-government approach to protecting the country’s cyber 
security networks. In May 2009, President Obama said “cybersecurity is one of the most 
serious economic and national security challenges we face as a nation”192 One of the 
                                                 
192 “The Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative.” 
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goals of the Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative (CNCI) was to “establish a 
front line against threats by creating shared situational awareness of network 
vulnerabilities, and threats.”193 This framework allows for the CNCI goal to be realized. 
The framework that provides a front-line defense for SLTT governments will also be of 
great benefit to the federal cyber centers through the sharing of indicators and actionable 
cyber intelligence that can be used to identify the TTPs of the adversary. The TTPs can 
be used to build a better security mechanism to protect computer networks against future 
cyber attacks and unwarranted intrusions. This mutual benefit will be shared by both 
federal and SLTT governments as summarized in Figure 5.  
(4) Risk 
The risk of inaction places SLTT governments in a continuous cycle of proactive 
response to cyber attacks and intrusions. A fusion center cyber team with the authority of 
the state governor to support and defend the computer networks of state government 









                                                 
193 Ibid. 
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F. IMPLEMENTATION: TIMEFRAME AND COST 
The implementation of this process is accomplished in four phases, as seen in 
Figure 5. The phases are interdependent. One process does not need to be completed 
before the other processes start.  
 
Figure 5.  Cyber Fusion Center Implementation Plan 
(1) Phase I: Framework  
The governor as the leader and owner of state assets must support the framework. 
The Secretary of Homeland Security as the federal agent with ultimate responsibility for 
the care, feeding, and direction of the fusion centers must support the framework. The 
MOA that provides the authority for the development and operational framework of the 
CDEST teams is the key to the success of the strategy. 
(2) Phase II: Infrastructure 
Identification, assessment, development, accreditation, and certification of the 
fusion center physical infrastructure are undertaken in the second phase of the 
framework. The communications infrastructure is also put in place during Phase II. This 
phase ensures the interoperability amongst federal agencies and SLTT governments. A 
standard and repeatable physical infrastructure is identified and incorporated with a 
specific set of standardized data sources. The key is to develop a secure and standardize 
infrastructure that can be replicated throughout the country. 
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(3) Phase III: Implementation 
Phase III corresponds with Section Five of the implementation plan. Initially, the 
cyber teams deployed to the fusion centers would engage five sectors within the state’s 
infrastructure: state government, educational institutions, banking and finance, 
healthcare, and critical infrastructure. These five sectors may be expanded as the maturity 
of the teams and the processes mature. However, the cyber domain and threat is so large 
and evolving so quickly that it is important that the teams do not try to be all things to all 
people and organizations. The initial process will build network maps, identify network 
security processes, identify and communicate directly with security operations center 
personnel at the stakeholder’s organization, identify strengths and weaknesses in the 
stakeholder’s computer network, and incorporate security upgrades as needed.  
(4) Phase IV: Cybersecurity Teams 
In this final phase, the CDEST teams will be developed as an integrated group of 
cyber professionals at the GS-11 through GS-14 level. This level provides a mix of 
experience that will allow for current and future requirements. The primary lead for the 
team can be a GS-15. The DHS CSA concept discussed earlier will normally be 
designated as the lead for the team. The team will consist of an FBI representative, a state 
representative, a National Guard representative, and the fifth billet can be filled by any of 
the four organizations. The key for the team is to be organized jointly from a homeland 
security, law enforcement, state, and National Guard representative perspective. The 
second important aspect is the qualifications. The team must have mid-level to senior-
level personnel with computer experience. The team will work at the cross-section 
between federal and state organizations. They will have the authority to access 
stakeholder’s computer networks and they will have a tool set to allow them to provide 
state-of-the-art cyber security support. All four phases of the framework can be 
accomplished within a six-month timeframe, at minimal cost, and the teams can be in the 
cyber center and operational. 
So far, the study has focused on federal assets but the state and local governments 
must take a lead role in developing the cyber workforce of the future. “Hiring new 
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employees, training or retraining current employees and contracting out for cybersecurity 
services are three ways that states can meet their needs.”194 Another key resource is the 
state colleges and universities. The state and local governments would be wise to start a 
partnership with state higher education institutes to establish a pipeline to hire young 
graduates (lower initial payroll cost although it may also be a higher turnover rate after 
two years) and provide an opportunity to work immediately after graduation. 
Another source of a cybersecurity workforce are the states’ National Guard units. 
During last year’s NGA Forum on Cybersecurity, Lieutenant General Ed Cardin of the 
USCC “highlighted the Kansas Intelligence Fusion Centers’ intelligence program as a 
nation-wide model and best practice with private sector partners.”195 He also commented 
on the success of the small teams utilized during the Iraq War for intelligence purposes as 
discussed previously. The key is to utilize multiple sources to staff the fusion centers.  
(5) Costs 
The framework will use existing infrastructure (physical and communications) 
and existing personnel currently in the system. Both DHS and DOJ have personnel who 
can be reassigned to the fusion centers in support of cyber operations. Since the cyber 
expertise is not currently in place, the manning structure will need to be adjusted and the 
familiarization training will be required to ensure the cyber team has a clear 
understanding of the capabilities and mission functionality available to them at the 
federal level. Also, familiarization will be needed to understand the structure of the SLTT 
government stakeholder networks.  
G. MEASURING SUCCESS 
Success is measured through the ability of the cybersecurity teams to process 
actionable information and interact with stakeholders within the five targeted sectors and 
provide dynamic cybersecurity defensive protection measures, as well as by the 
                                                 
194 National Governors Association, Cybersecurity Workforce Key To Combating Threats, October 
27, 2014, http://www.nga.org/cms/home/news-room/news-releases/2014--news-releases/col2-content/
cybersecurity-workforce-key-to-c.html 
195 Sean Lyngaas, “Cyber Threat Challenges Military Structure,” The Business of Federal 
Technology, February 23, 2015, https://fcw.com/articles/2015/02/23/cyber-threat-challenges-military.aspx.  
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hardening of the computer network infrastructure of SLTT governments. Success is 
measured through the value proposition as described in the overall whole-of-government 
strategy. Success can be measured by first using a test case and state to implement the 
plan. The State of Maryland is located in an optimal location to test this strategy and 
framework. The six cyber centers are all located within the Washington, DC metro area. 
The Maryland Fusion Center (MCAC) has the physical and communication infrastructure 
already in place. The offices of Governor O’Malley of Maryland and Secretary Johnson 
of DHS are a 45-minute drive away. The State of Maryland computer networks provide 
fertile ground for the cybersecurity teams forward-deployed to the fusion centers. All 
four phases of the process can be completed within a six-month timeframe and the teams 
can be on the ground and operational. The teams have an ample opportunity to test their 
abilities to deploy tools and techniques shared by federal partners and to interact with 
state-level stakeholders and asset owners. Similar to the cryptologic support groups 
described at the beginning of the chapter, the cyber security teams will also be expected 
to facilitate the cyber intelligence process, provide cyber and computer expertise to the 
designated five sectors, educate the customer, provide direct reach back to home base and 
to federal government partners, and provide dynamic cybersecurity watch operations 
support.  
H. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The research question, Should regional state and local fusion centers assist to 
prevent, mitigate, and deter cyber threats targeted at state, local, tribal, and territorial 
(SLTT) entities, was examined during this thesis. The research investigated the 
organizational and individual damage cyber threats can impose upon state and local 
government (government, finance, education, and critical infrastructure) computer 
networks. The research also examined the concept of deploying dedicated cyber support 
teams directly into local and regional fusion centers to spearhead and standardize a 
cybersecurity mission to prevent, mitigate, and deter cyber threats targeted at SLTT 
government computer networks.  
 81 
The research began by analyzing the cyber threat to the nation. FBI Director 
Robert Mueller stated, “Terrorism does remain the FBI’s top priority, but in the not too-
distant-future we anticipate that the cyber threat will pose the greatest threat to our 
country.”196 The major types of computer system vulnerabilities were examined. In 
addition, the major cyber criminals and hacktivists who attempt to take advantage of 
these vulnerabilities for personal gain, to support a specific cause, and in support of a 
specific entity, were analyzed to understand better the actors behind the computer 
screens.  
The focus of this thesis was to analyze the cyber threat to SLTT entities. The 
research primarily focused on state government departments and agencies, banking and 
finance, infrastructure systems, colleges and universities, and PII. How to best protect 
these SLTT computer networks would be the result of the research.  
The research continued with an examination of the fusion centers’ mission and the 
ability of fusion centers to accept a new mission focused on cybersecurity defense, 
mitigation, and analysis, including the establishment of cybersecurity teams or groups 
resident within the centers. A strategy for state and regional fusion centers to partner with 
the federal government’s department and agencies in a consolidated cybersecurity 
mission was provided. Also, as stated previously, a coordinated effort across the fusion 
center landscape must be made to ensure a cyber security standard or guideline to assist 
with interoperability and communication across the national network of fusion centers.  
The research revealed that fusion centers do have the authority to perform a cyber 
mission. This authority was granted with the passing of the Homeland Security Act of 
2002. Although, the cyber threat was not considered as the fusion center mission was 
being developed. The threat from cyber attacks was not as prevalent then as it is today. A 
chart was provided that showed the growth of the cyber threat and examples were 
provided of fusion centers capable of absorbing a cyber mission. The fusion center is 
uniquely positioned to absorb a cyber mission and every effort should be made to 
                                                 
196 Ibid. 
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establish a standard across the U.S. fusion center network to enhance the cyber protection 
of SLTT computer networks. 
In closing, on April 1, 2015, President Barack Obama said at the signing of an 
EO, “Blocking the property of certain persons engaging in significant malicious cyber-
ended activities. The increasing prevalence and severity of malicious cyber-enabled 
activities originating from, or directed by persons located, in whole or in substantial part, 
outside the United States constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national 
security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States. I hereby declare a national 
emergency to deal with this threat.”197  
Fusion centers were established with the “ultimate goal to provide a mechanism 
through which government (federal and state), law enforcement, public safety, and the 
private sector can come together with a common purpose and improve the ability to 
safeguard our homeland and prevent criminal activity.”198 By combining President 
Obama’s previous comment with the ultimate goal of the fusion centers, the research 
question should not be, should regional state and local fusion centers assist to prevent, 
mitigate, and deter cyber threats targeted at SLTT entities; but, why does not every 
regional state and local fusion center have a cyber mission with dedicated cybersecurity 
teams to assist in the prevention, mitigation, and deterrence of cyber threats targeted at 
SLTT entities? This thesis provides a framework to accomplish the mission to secure 
SLTT computer networks by incorporating cyber security teams within fusion centers.  
                                                 
197 “Executive Order—Blocking the Property of Certain Persons Engaging in Significant Malicious 
Cyber-Enabled Activities,” accessed April 15, 2015, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/04/
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